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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
WILLS-EsINcE oF Su-vrvoisa'p CLAUsE-ANTILAPSE STATUTE STILL
APPLIEs-Detzel v. Nieberding, 7 Ohio Misc. 262, 219 N.E2d 327 (P. Ct.
1966)-Testatrix bequeathed 5,000 dollars to her sister, legatee, "provided
she be living at the time of my death."' Legatee predeceased testatrix leaving
a daughter, plaintiff, as sole surviving issue. Plaintiff contended that the gift
lapsed and that the Ohio antilapse statute2 applied to the bequest so that
she should receive the 5,000 dollars. The residuary legatees, three local chari-
ties, opposed the application of the statute on the grounds that the words
of survivorship precluded its operation. In an action for declatory judg-
ment, the Hamilton County probate court held that the antilapse statute
applied to the bequest, because the words of survivorship were not sufficient
evidence of an intent that the statute not be applied.3
The effect of the antilapse statue is to give a bequest made to a rela-
tive, who predeceases the testator, to that relative's issue4 rather than allow
the bequest to lapse and pass to the residuary beneficiary or, if there is no
residuary clause, pass intestate. The purpose of the statute is to dispose of
lapsed bequests in the manner the testator most likely would have intended
had he considered the possibility of lapse. 5 Therefore, the statute is not ap-
plied where testator expresses an intent contrary to the statutory distribu-
tion of lapsed bequests. The issue in this case was whether the words of sur-
vivorship showed intent to defeat the operation of the statute.6
Ohio has not ruled on this precise issuer although other jurisdictions
1 Detzel v. Nieberding, 7 Ohio Misc. 262, 219 N.,.2d 327, 329 (P. Ct. 1966).
2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 210752 (Page 1964):
When a devise of real or personal estate is made to a relative of a testator and
such relative was dead at the time the will was made, or dies thereafter, leaving
issue surviving the testator, such issue shall take the estate devised as the
devisee would have done if he had survived the testator. If the testator de-
vised a residuary estate or the entire estate after debts, other legacies and de-
vises, general or specific, or an interest less than a fee or absolute ownership
to such devisee and relatives of the testator and such devisee leaves no issue,
the estate devised shall vest in such other devisees surviving the testator in such
proportions as the testamentary share of each devisee in the devised property
bears to the total of the shares of all the surviving devisees, unless a different
disposition is made or required by the will.
3 Detzel v. Nieberding, supra note 1, at 274, 219 N.E.2d at 336.
4 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.52 (Page 1964).
5 Woolley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599 (1889).
o Bensing, "The Ohio Antilapse Statute," 28 Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1959). Robert C. Bensing
discussed this issue and concluded:
Where a testator makes a gift to a relative ... [and] uses other words which
indicate that the donee is to receive the gift only if he survives the testator,
the statute obviously does not apply. Supra at 28.
7 Ohio has had several cases dealing with a similar issue-the effect of words of
survivorship on class gifts. Shumaker v. Pearson, 67 Ohio St. 330, 65 N.E. 1005 (1902);
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have. For example, in In re Parker's Estate,8 which involved a bequest to
testator's sister "if she survives me," and "if she does not survive me to
her husband," both the sister and her husband predeceased testator and
the sister's chidren claimed the sister's share under the New York antilapse
statute.9 The court held the statute inapplicable because testator so in-
tended.' 0 The words of survivorship were held to be a condition to the be-
quest, which the legatee failed to meet. The testator intended that the
bequest lapse if the condition was not met because an alternative bequest
was made to the husband. The condition upon which the first bequest was
based had not been met and failure of the alternative bequest did not revive
the first. Therefore, the antilapse statute was inapplicable.
Numerous cases agree with In re Parker's Estate."1 The consensus has
been summarized as follows: "When the testator uses words of survivor-
ship, indicating an intention that the legatee shall take the gift only if he
outlives the testator, it is clear that the statute against lapses has no ap-
plication."' 2
Woolley v. Paxson, supra note 5; Everhard v. Brown, 75 Ohio App. 451, 62 N.E.2d
901 (1945). Thatcher v. Trouslot, 52 Ohio App. 74, 3 N.E.2d 57 (1935); Gale v. Keyes,
45 Ohio App. 61, 186 N.E. 755 (1933). The issue in these cases is not the same as in
the Detzel case. The former deal with the question of when a class is determined and
whether the non-survivors' issue can take a part. Generally, Ohio courts hold the issue
can. These cases do not deal with lapsed bequests. The issue in Detzel, however, in-
volved a lapsed bequest and whether it should pass under the statute or the common
law rule.
8 15 Misc. 2d 162, 181 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
9 N. Y. Deced. Est. Law § 29:
Whenever any estate, real or personal, shall be devised or bequeathed to a child
or other descendant of the testator, or to a brother or sister of the testator, and
such legatee or devisee shall die during the lifetime of the testator, leaving a
child or other descendant who shall survive such testator, such devise or legacy
shall not lapse, but the property so devised or bequeathed shall vest in the sur-
viving child or other descendant of the legatee or devisee, as if such legatee
or devisee had survived the testator and had died intestate.
10 In re Parker's Estate supra note 8, at 164, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
11 Williams v. Williams, 152 Fla. 255, 9 S.2d 798 (1942); In re Barrett's Estate,
159 Fla. 901, 33 S.2d 139 (1958); In re Gerde's Estate, 245 Iowa 778, 62 N.W.2d 777
(1954); Wallace v. Diehl, 202 N.Y. 156, 95 N.E. 646 (1911); In re Fischer's Estate,
188 Misc. 654, 66 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Conay's Estate, 29 Misc. 2d
1095, 121 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Schaertl's Will, 207 Misc. 406, 138
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Surr. Ct. 1955); In re Moore's Will, 13 Misc. 2d 640, 177 N.YS.2d 367
(Surr. Ct. 1958); Kunkel v. Kunkel, 267 Pa. 163, 110 A. 73 (1920).
12 Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1172, 1186 (1959)-This note is a supplement to an earlier
note which said:
Where the testator uses words of survivorship, indicating an intention that the
legatee shall take the gift only if he outlives the testator, it is dear that the
statute against lapses has no application. In such a case the condition attached
to the gift fails immediately upon the death of the legatee, and there is nothing
upon which the statute can operate. This result is so obvious as not to require
citation of authority. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 846, 857 (1934).
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Authority contrary to this rule is scarce. In In re Jerge's Will' 3 the
court held that a bequest made "if my son ... survives me" did not lapse. 14
The court said that the words of survivorship were surplusage and that the
testator's intent, gleaned from the rest of the will, was clearly that he
wanted the children of his son to take the property the son would have re-
ceived, if he had survived. Although this case has been limited to its facts,15
the court's approach has more general application.
The Detzel case is similar to In re Jerge's Will in that both have ambi-
guities as to testator's intent. Examination of the will in Detzel reveals facts
which indicate that testatrix did not use the words of survivorship to pre-
vent operation of the antilapse statute. Five money bequests were made in
Item 5 of the will, each qualified by the words, "provided he (she) be living
at the time of my death." One such bequest was made "to my beloved sister-
in-law."' 6 If testatrix had inserted these words of survivorship in order to
prevent the operation of the antilapse statute, there was no reason to use
these words in the bequest to a sister-in-law. A sister-in-law is not a rela-
tive and, therefore, a bequest to a sister-in-law is never affected by the
antilapse statute.17 Thus, the argument that the words of survivorship were
used to prevent operation of the antilapse statute appears untenable, and
the words seem "more the mannerism of the draftsman than an expression
of the intent of the testator."'5
Another of these bequests was made to testatrix's brother. In Item 1
of the testatrix's codicil, she revoked that bequest "since . . . (he) prede-
ceased me." The codicil made no other distribution of the revoked bequest
and it, therefore, passed under the residual clause just as the money would
have done had the bequest to the plaintiff mother lapsed. Again, if the rea-
son testatrix imposed a condition of survivorship was to avoid operation
of the antilapse statute, then testatrix did not have to revoke this bequest
because it would have lapsed and passed to the residuary legatees. 10
The above facts, although not conclusive, tend to indicate that testatrix
did not mean the words of survivorship to have the result of avoiding the
antilapse statute. On the other hand, the words of survivorship, when given
their usual meaning, impose a condition to the bequest and that condition
not having been met, the result is that the bequest fails and the antilapse
statute cannot be applied.2 0 Since in construing a will, all parts of the will
13 180 N.Y. Misc. 268, 40 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
14 Id. at 270, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
15 In re Parker's Estate, supra note 8. "There may be cases where such text may
be regarded as 'more the mannerism of the draftsman than an expression of the intent
of the testator', and may be rejected as mere surplusage." Id. at 163, 181 N.Y.S.2d at
713. See also In re Conay's Estate, supra note 11.
16 Memorandum for Plaintiff, p. 5.
17 Schaefer v. Bernhardt, 76 Ohio St. 443, 81 N.E. 640 (1907).
Is In re Jerge's Will, supra note 13, at 269, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
19 Memorandum for Plaintiff, p. 5.
20 There is a distinction between a bequest which fails and one which lapses.
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must be construed together and given effect if possible,2 ' an ambiguity exists
between the facts above and the words of survivorship as to which indicates
testatrix's true intent. The court in In re Jerge's Will had a similar problem
to resolve and did so by reading the words of survivorship out of the
will. The court in Detzel solved the same problem by a rule of construction,
that whenever an ambiguity exists as to whether testator intended the anti-
lapse statute to apply, the ambiguity will be resolved by presuming the
operation of the statute.22
This presumption in favor of the operation of the statute in cases of
ambiguity is based on the policy behind the antilapse statute as set out in
Woolley v. Paxson.2 3 The court in Woolley said that the statute was meant
to remedy the harshness caused by the common law lapse rule which gen-
erally acted to defeat testator's real intent.2 4 Testators make wills as if
they take effect immediately and rarely consider the possibility that a be-
quest might lapse if the legatee predeceases testator. The court characterized
the statute as a reflection of the probable intent of most testators, were they
to consider the problem.25 Therefore, the statute should be given a liberal
construction so as to remedy the "mischief" it was devised to cure.
The Detzel decision reflects the policy stated in Woolley and advances
a rule which maximizes the usefulness of the statute by preventing ambiguous
bequests from lapsing. This same presumption was made in Larwill v.
Ewing,26 where the issue was whether the statute applied to a bequest in a
will whose codicil said that the testator intended that those excluded from
the will should not participate in his estate. Legatee in that case had issue
who were not mentioned in the will or codicil and hence the testator's intent
was unclear as to whether his codicil was meant to prevent operation of the
statute. The court ruled that the statute would be applied to the will, 27 the
presumption being that the statute would apply unless a contrary intent
was clearly and unambiguously stated in the will.
The Detzel decision would be supported by prior case law had the court
been content to limit the rule set down to ambiguities caused by words of
survivorship conflicting with other evidence in the will. However, the opinion
of the court is not limited to such cases. The court claims that the same
presumption always applies to wills and that the only time words of survivor-
ship can avoid the operation of the antilapse statute is when there is also an
The former are those bequests which, because a condition precedent is not met, never
takes effect and is not a bequest at all. The latter has effect and is a valid bequest but
a bequest for which there is no legatee, due to his death.
21 Townsend's Executors v. Townsend, 25 Ohio St. 477, 487 (1874).
22 Detzel v. Nieberding, supra note 1, at 266, 219 N.E.2d at 331.
23 Woolley v. Paxson, supra note 5.
24 Id. at 314, 24 N.E. at 601.
25 Ibid.
26 73 Ohio St. 177, 76 N.E. 503 (1905). See also In re Finche's Estate, 239 Iowa
1069, 32 N.W.2d 819 (1948); Henney v. Ertl, 7 NJ. Super. 401, 71 A.2d 546 (Ch.
1950), where the same presumption is made.
27 Larwill v. Ewing, 73 Ohio St. 177, 182, 76 N.E. 503, 504 (1905).
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alternative bequest. 28 But, if, as the court claims,29 a court's purpose in con-
struing a will is to give effect to testator's intent, then certainly the statute
will not apply when no alternative bequest is made, but the testator's intent
is clear that it should not apply. 0
The real problem created by DetzeZ, however, is the case where no evi-
dence is available as to testator's intent concerning operation of the antilapse
statute other than the words of survivorship. According to the Detzel rule
the presumption is that the statute applies. But in such a case, the words
of survivorship are unambiguous and are consistently held to impose a con-
dition of survivorship.31 To apply the presumption of the applicability of
the statute to such a case would more often than not have the effect of
defeating testator's intent. A testator's intent must be ascertained by giving
the words used in the will their ordinary meaning.3 2 The ordinary meaning
of words of survivorship is the meaning given to these words by all the
other courts that have ruled on the issue. Therefore, the presumption of the
applicability of the statute should not be applied to such a case.
If Detzel really is a case of ambiguity, then the result of the case is
correct and the rule of presumption is properly applied.3 3 Nevertheless ap-
plying this same rule to all cases dealing with words of survivorship is con-
trary to the established rules of will construction.
TORTS-INURy WITHOUT IMPACT DUE To NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED FRIGHT
COALPENsABLE-Falzone v. Buzsch, 45 NJ. 559, 214 A.2d 121 (1965)-
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held that substantial physical
injury sustained as a result of negligently caused fear of immediate personal
injury is compensable notwithstanding the absence of impact.' Charles Fal-
zone and his wife Mabel sued to recover for their injuries caused by the
defendant's negligent driving. The complaint alleged that Charles was struck
by the defendant's automobile as he stood in a field near the roadway. It
28 Detzel v. Nieberding, supra note 1, at 274, 219 N.E.2d at 336.
29 Id. at 265, 219 N.E.2d at 330.
30 For example, the statute should not apply where the will states, "this bequest
passes only if legatee survives me and by this I mean that § 2107.52, Revised Code,
should not apply under any circumstances," even though no alternative bequest is made.
31 Supra notes 11 and 12.
32 Findley v. City of Conneaut, 145 Ohio St. 480, 62 N.E.2d 318 (1945).
83 Larwill v. Ewing, supra note 27.
1 Falzone v. Busch, 45 NJ. 559, 214 A.2d 121 (1965). Several other states have
allowed recovery where injuries have resulted from fright caused by negligent conduct
where there was no impact and where the plaintiff was in the zone of danger at the time
of the negligent act. Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Robb
v. Pennsylvania R.R., - Del. -, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Chiuchiolo v. New England
Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
219 N.YS.2d 34 (1961); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
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further alleged that Mabel was sitting in her husband's car near the scene
of the accident and that the defendant's car passed so close to her as to put
her in fear of her own safety. Physical consequences followed, and she re-
quired medical treatment. The lower court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the count alleging the wife's injuries, but the su-
preme court reversed.2
In so holding, the Falzone court disregarded the precedent of the state
set by Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R.,3 which involved a driver
trapped between railroad crossing gates which the defendant-railroad's ser-
vant had negligently lowered leaving the driver to face an approaching train.
Fright was alleged as the cause of the driver's later paralysis although there
was a complete absence of impact. The Ward court stated three reasons for
denying recovery: (1) it could not be proven that the negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury; (2) there existed no precedent for allowing
such recovery; and (3) if such recovery were allowed, the result would be a
flood of litigation. Another reason for denying recovery occasionally cited in
other cases is the absence of foreseeability.4 A close analysis will discredit
these reasons and support the result of the instant case.
Looking first to proximate cause, it is not difficult to understand the un-
willingness of the 1900 Ward court to conclude that physical injury could be
the result of fright because convincing medical evidence was not available
then. But, today, there can be little doubt that fright can and does cause
physical injuries. 5 To an innocent plaintiff, the cost of an injury is the same
whether it was produced by fright or by physical contact. While it is true
that in practice it remains difficult to prove that fright is the proximate cause
of physical injury, difficulty of proof should never be a reason for denying
recovery. The New York Court of Appeals has said in Woods v. Lancet that
"it is an inadmissible concept that uncertainty of proof can ever destroy a
legal right."0 The Falzone court rightly concluded that fright can be the
proximate cause of injury.
To substantiate the conclusion that difficulty in proving proximate cause
is not a valid reason for disallowing recovery, one has only to look to the
2 Ibid.
3 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 AtI. 561 (1900).
4 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.4 (1956).
S Smith, "Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli" 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944); Smith and Solomon, "Traumatic Neuroses in Court"
30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943). See Gair, "Damages For Fear And Mental Pain" 41 B.U.L.
Rev. 342, 343 (1961) which states:
We now know that sudden fright may produce changes in the nervous system,
that the nerve centers of the body are a part of the physical system, susceptible
to lesions not only from direct external causes acting primarily on the mind,
lesions are just as serious and disability-producing as a broken bone or a tear-
ing of the flesh. We know that fear may detrimentally affect the action of the
heart, the circulation of the blood, the temperature of the body, and the nervous
system, with residual physical disability.
6 33 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
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slight impact cases. Many states, which prohibit recovery when there is no
impact, allow recovery when there is a slight impact although such impact
did not in any way cause the injury for which suit was brought.7 The appar-
ent reason for this requirement of at least a slight impact is to foreclose the
possibility of false claims. However, as certain courts and commentators have
recognized, the jury's task is no more difficult in cases of no impact than in
cases of slight impact.8 Because it would be extremely easy to fabricate a
slight impact, there appears to be no logical distinction between slight impact
and no impact cases.9
The argument frequently advanced that there is no precedent for allow-
ing recovery where there is no impact, again, is not persuasive for denying
recovery. In some areas of law such as property and trusts, stare decisis plays
an extremely important role, but in changing fields such as constitutional law
and torts, stare decisis should be relegated to a much lesser role.10 Further-
more, precedent should never be blindly followed regardless of the area of
the law involved.
7 Clark v. Choctawatchee Electric Co-op., 107 So.2d 609 (Fla., 1958) (electric
shock); Kentucky Traction & Term. Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d
272 (1929) (trifling burn) ; Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910) (forc-
ibly seated on floor); Homans v. Boston Elev. Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902)
(slight blow); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of
smoke); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d
549 (1962) (trivial jolt).
8 The Supreme Court of New Hamshire has stated that:
From the viewpoint of analogy, allowance for mental pain, and for injury
to the mind and nerve as well as body, is given as items of damage in all cases
of liability for personal injury where there is impact. It would seem practically
as easy to pretend them and as difficult to disprove them in such cases as in
cases where there is no impact and fright is the intervening agency of trans-
mittal. When neuresthenia is claimed as a result of a bodily injury, the connec-
tion between the injury and the disease and the extent and severity of the
disease are no less uncertain and subject to objective tests than when fright
takes the place of bodily impact.
Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 334, 150 Atl. 540, 543
(1930). See also McNiece, "Physic Injury and Liability in New York." 24 St. John's L.
Rev. 1, 30 (1949).
9 Mr. Justice Musmanno, dissenting in Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 175, 142
A.2d 263, 270 (1958), pointedly refuted the argument that lack of impact should be an
arbitrary barrier to recovery.
Are our courts so naive, are they so gullible, are they so devoid of worldly
knowledge, are they so childlike in their approach to realities that they can be
deceived and hoodwinked by claims that have no factual, medical or legalistic
basis? If they are, then all our proud boasts of the worthiness of our judicial
system are empty and vapid indeed.
10 See Aigler, "Law Reform by Rejection of Stare Decisis" 5 Ariz. L. Rev. 155
(1964); Aigler, "Stare Decisis and Legal Education" 4 Ariz. L. Rev. 39 (1962); Keeton,
"Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts" 75 Harv. L. Rev. 463 (1962); Comment,
"A Practical Approach to Stare Decisis" 5 Ariz. L. Rev. 67 (1964).
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A precedent, in law, in order to be binding, should appeal to logic
and a genuine sense of justice. What lends dignity to the law
founded on precedent is that, if analyzed, the particularly cited case
wields authority by the sheer force of its self-integrated honesty,
integrity, and rationale. A precedent can not and should not, con-
trol, if its strength depends alone on the fact that it is old, but may
crumble at the slightest probing touch of instinctive reason and
natural justice."
A third reason for which courts deny recovery in absence of impact is
their fear of a "flood of litigation." This argument can be dismissed, as it
was in Faizone, as completely unsupported and unsupportable.' 2 Fear of an
expanded court docket seems particularly inept as a reason for denying jus-
tice where a meritorious claim is stated.
The only ground upon which recovery without impact may be justly
criticized is that of foreseeability because the defendant could only be ex-
pected to foresee consequences from fright to a person of average sensitivity
where defendant's wrongful act was merely negligent and not willful and
wanton.' 3 A negligent defepdant should not be responsible for the risk of
hypersensitivity unless he knows or should have known of it from the facts
in his possession at the time of the negligent act; 14 for unless a negligent
defendant can foresee hypersensitivity, he has no basis on which to know that
his acts might cause injury. Thus, it would seem unfair to hold him respon-
sible for the consequences of that hypersensitivity. Further, the burden re-
sulting from restricting the defendant's conduct so as not to cause injury
from fright to a hypersensitive person outweighs the risk of causing such
injury, because of the low probability of encountering a hypersensitive per-
son. This latter concept has been incorporated into the definition of negli-
gence, defined as the taking of unreasonable risks of causing damage.15 Each
time a person drives an automobile through a populated area, he takes a
11 Supra note 9, at 183, 142 A.2d at 274. An early New York decision, Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), which was very similar in result to
the Ward case, has been severely criticized for relying on doubtful precedent. McNiece,
supra note 8, at 25.
12 McNiece, supra note 8, at 31, states: "The final straw to break the back of the
'flood of litigation' argument is the fact that the reported cases reveal that the volume
of litigation has been heaviest in those states denying recovery due to the extensive ex-
ceptions always constructed by the courts of such states."
'3 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.4 (1956).
14 Toelle, "The Urban Case," 27 Conn. B.J. 74, 81 (1953) states:
One who intentionally causes emotional distress may to be sure take the risk
that the other may have subnormal emotional resistance-at least where that
vulnerability is of a regularly recurring kind like pregnancy. But the rule is
stricter where the act is not intentional (in that sense) but only negligent. Here
the actor takes the risk of idiosyncracy only if he knows or should have known
of it from the facts of the specific case.
See also Restatement (Second), Torts § 313, comment b (1965).
15 Prosser, Torts 148 (3d ed. 1964).
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risk, however small, of driving too close to a hypersensitive person and
thereby causing damage, but that risk is not an unreasonable one due to its
low probability of ever materializing. As the conduct does not involve un-
reasonable risk, the driver cannot be said to be negligent as to that extra-
sensitive person.
Two noted authorities have observed that fright must be "very harrow-
ing" before it presents a threat to persons of average mental composure.
16
They further observe that most people have survived without harm a great
number of near automobile collisions.17 It is arguable that the injury to Mrs.
Falzone was not reasonably foreseeable, but, on the other hand, the near
accident which threatened Mrs. Falzone may have been the type of thing
which does not occur often and which would cause harm to the normal per-
son. This question cannot be resolved from the short statement of facts given
in the case. Furthermore, it is not apparent as to what degree the defendant
in the instant case was negligent; slight negligence, a much more common
occurrence, should be less blameworthy than gross negligence. Clearly a
grossly negligent defendant should be held to a higher standard of liability
and to a lesser requirement of foreseeability than a slightly negligent de-
fendant. Were defendant's negligence so gross as to be classified as willful
and wanton, he could be held to have taken the risk of hypersensitivity.
Another prerequisite to recovery cited in some states is that the plaintiff
must have been situated in the zone of danger at the time of the negligent
act.'8 Thus, New York puts a limitation on liability in that a plaintiff by-
stander may not recover; 19 that is, the plaintiff must allege that he was in
the zone of danger to state a good cause of action. The Falzone court did not
discuss the problem in terms of zone of danger, but it is likely that New
Jersey would impose the same requirement in a bystander situation. Courts
in different states discuss the matter of proximity of the plaintiff to the
negligent act, in different terms, but the requirement appears to be exactly
the same.20
Upon the facts of the instant case, it would be extremely difficult to
predict the result Ohio courts would reach because numerous cases indicate
16 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.4 (1956).
17 Ibid.
Is Cases cited note 1 supra.
19 Kalina v. General Hospital of City of Syracuse, 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d
733 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
20 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has stated that if it is reasonably
foreseeable that plaintiff, as situated, would be likely to be injured, the court is justified
in finding that plaintiff was within the zone of danger. Strazza v. McKittrick, supra
note 1, at 713, 156 A.2d at 151. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has discussed the prob-
lem in terms of the duty owed by defendant to plaintiff; the discussion seems to imply
that a duty of care is owed to people in the field of peril. Colla v. Mandella, supra note
1, at 598, 85 N.W.2d at 347. It seems that any attempt to distinguish between reasonable
foreseeability with respect to physical location, duty of care to those in the field of peril,
and zone of danger would amount to nothing more than begging the question because
courts use the terms interchangeably.
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that the Ohio law in this area is dated and confusing. The earliest Ohio case
dealing with similar facts was Miller v. Baltimore & 0. Southwestern RI. 2 1
which was decided in 1908 and seems to indicate that Ohio would deny re-
covery for consequences of fright where there was no contemporaneous physi-
cal injury. Although the Miller court did not discuss the case in terms of
"impact," the contemporaneous physical injury requirement seems to include
an impact greater than a slight touching plus a resulting contemporaneous
injury. Miller employed the standard reasons for denying recovery used in
Ward and Mitchell.22 However, the 1930 decision of Morton v. Stack23 ap-
pears to have invoked the slight impact rule to allow recovery although the
court did not mention this theory; Prosser has cited this case as an example
of the slight impact rule.2 4 Recovery was allowed although there was a com-
plete absence of contemporaneous physical injury.
In 1939, the Ohio Supreme Court, without mentioning Morton, appar-
ently rejected the Morton rule in Davis v. Cleveland Ry.25 The court arbi-
trarily denied recovery because there was an absence of contemporaneous
physical injury although there was a slight impact; the court considered
itself bound by precedent. A ray of hope emerged from the decision for Judge
Zimmerman stated:
Frankly, the writer of this opinion believes that the sounder and
more logical rule is as stated in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, . ..,
as follows: "We conclude that where a physical injury results from
fright or other mental shock, caused by the wrongful act or omis-
sion of another, the injured party is entitled to recover his dam-
ages, provided the act or omission is the proximate cause of the
injury, and the injury ought in the light of all the circumstances, to
have been forseen as a natural and probable consequence thereof." 26
21 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908). There, one of the defendant's railroad cars
rolled onto the plaintiff's property; there was no impact with the plaintiff's person, but
fright caused permanent impairment of her health.
22 The Miller case was criticized in Green, "Fright Cases," 27 Iln. L. Rev. 761, 765
(1933).
23 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930). The case involved a child plaintiff who
was trapped for 15 or 20 minutes in a smoke-filled apartment building; he recovered
a judgment for a convulsion suffered a year and a half later. Apparently, the inhalation
of smoke satisfied the requirement of slight impact. As the defendant was the owner
of the apartment building, an aspect of the landlord-tenant relationship may have played
a role in this decision, but the court failed to mention it specifically.
24 Prosser, Torts 350 (3d ed. 1962).
25 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939). There the plaintiff was caught in elec-
trically operated folding streetcar doors, the edges encased in soft rubber pressing against
the plaintiff, which would certainly satisfy the slight impact requirement. She suffered
no physical injury at the time, but she later suffered a partial paralysis as a result
of her fright.
26 Id. at 405-06, 21 N.E.2d at 172. It is puzzling that the court did not look to the
special duty owed by a common carrier to its passengers and find some theory upon
which to grant the plaintiff relief.
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Some relief came in 1941 when an Ohio court of appeals refused to
apply the Davis rule to acts which are willful and wanton 27 In that case, an
insurance agent allegedly made a statement to plaintiff's decedent that she
had cancer at the time she secured an insurance policy to cause her to sur-
render the policy, which statement caused her to die from shock of the in-
formation. 28 Recovery was denied because the petition failed to show that
the insurance agent intended to injure the deceased.29 The court stated that
"[i] t is the settled law of this state that no liability exists for acts of negli-
gence causing mere fright or shock, unaccompanied by contemporaneous
physical injury even though subsequent illness results, where the negligent
acts complained of, are neither willful nor malicious."30 Further, in 1944
although the Davis requirement of contemporaneous physical injury was
purportedly applied in Wolfe v. A. & P. Tea Co.,31 Wolfe held that the jury
should decide whether the injury requirement was satisfied where the plain-
tiff ate part of a worm with a canned peach and later became sick. In that
case a jury verdict allowing recovery, reversed by the court of appeals, was
reinstated by the Ohio Supreme Court.32 Thus, although the Davis rule was
still alive, it was weakened; at least this case was left to the jury. In a later
Ohio Supreme Court case a dissent recognized the modern viewpoint,33 but
that, of course, did little to weaken the Davis rule.
The most recent Ohio case3 4 involving a negligence action for injury
from fright involved a lady who suffered a fatal heart attack when a gasoline
truck exploded near her premises. The Ohio court of appeals denied recovery
27 Hillard v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 68 Ohio App. 426, 34 N.E.2d 75
(1941).
28 Id. at 428, 34 N.E.2d at 76.
29 Id. at 432-33, 34 N.E.2d at 78.
30 Id. at 430, 34 N.E.2d at 77.
31 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
32 Id. at 648, 56 NE.2d at 232.
33 In Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 317, 78 N.E.2d 735, 742 (1948), which
was an action for assault by the use of obnoxious language, Judge Hart stated in dissent:
At the present time, the courts in most American jurisdictions permit recovery
for physical harm or injury caused by mental distress for which the defendant
is wrongfully responsible, even though there is an absence of Contemporaneous
impact. There is in this country, however a sharp conflict of authority as to
whether there may be a recovery where a physical injury or illness results from
fright or mental shock caused by the negligent act of another, in the absence
of physical impact or the commission of an independent tort. In many cases,
representing a modem viewpoint, such a recovery is allowed.
Another ray of hope came from Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d
322 (1955). The court said that if the actor's conduct is negligent and if the actor
should recognize the unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm comes
from the internal operation of fright will not protect the actor from liability. This
statement is undoubtedly dictum because the act in question in that case was unques-
tionably willful. The plaintiff was injured from fright when the defendant placed a
rubber lizard in her lap.
34 Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113 Ohio App. 449, 172 N.E.2d 734 (1964).
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in the usual tenor for lack of contemporaneous physical injury, but its result
was not out of accord with Falzone because it did not appear that the de-
cedent was within the zone of danger when the negligent act occurred. 35
The foregoing cases indicate that Ohio has not yet adopted the modern
view as set forth in the Falzone case; possibly the reason is that the Ohio
courts have not had the opportunity in recent years to rule on the issue. As
the Ohio law now stands, it seems that recovery for consequences of fright
will be denied unless there is contemporaneous physical injury accompanying
it; however, it may be a jury question whether the injury requirement is ful-
filled. It is suggested that the courts of Ohio adopt the view that if a plaintiff
suffers substantial physical injury as a proximate result of fright negligently
caused by the defendant and occurring while plaintiff was in the zone of dan-
ger, and if the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that his conduct
would expose a person of normal sensitivity to unreasonable risk of bodily
harm through fright, then the defendant is liable notwithstanding the absence
of impact or contemporaneous physical injury or both.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-RxmND Fo1 TRL.L-APPIcATIoN Op
FnArriy Docu,m-Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)-Petitioner,
a newspaper editor, was charged with a violation of the Alabama Corrupt
Practices Act' for publishing an editorial on election day urging the citizens
of Birmingham to vote for a particular form of city government. The Ala-
bama statute prohibited any electioneering or the solicitation of any votes
on election day. The trial court sustained petitioner's demurrer, holding that
the statute abridged freedom of press. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed
and remanded,2 holding that petitioner had indeed violated the statute and
that the statute was "not an unreasonable limitation upon free speech." 3
Instead of submitting to a trial, petitioner admitted facts sufficient to con-
stitute a violation of the act, and appealed this ruling to the United States
Supreme Court which held that the state court judgment was final within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 12574 and that prohibition of editorial
35 The policy 'behind denying recovery where a plaintiff is not in the zone of
danger is that the defendant owes no duty to that type of plaintiff. Waube v. Warring-
ton, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); see also 35 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1935). See
discussion in the text accompanying notes 13-16, sazpra.
1 Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 17, §§ 268-286. § 285 makes it a crime "to do any elec-
tioneering or to solicit any votes ... in support of or in opposition to any proposition
that is being voted on on the day on which the election affecting such candidates or
propositions is being held."
2 State v. Mills, 278 Ala. 188, 176 So. 2d 884 (1965).
3 Id. at 196, 176 So. 2d at 890.
4 "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court... :' 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1964).
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publication on election day was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom
of speech and press.5
All Justices agreed that the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act infringed
freedom of the press. There were divergent views, however, on the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the finality doctrine. Since
the Alabama Supreme Court had merely reversed and remanded, the only
effect was to overrule the demurrer and send the case back to the trial
court for a jury trial of the issues. Petitioner claimed that the holding of the
state supreme court was binding upon the trial court to the extent that they
must convict him if he published the article, which he admitted he had
done. The majority agreed with petitioner that since there were no more
issues to be decided the judgment was final and could be appealed. The con-
curring opinion by Justice Douglas went one step further and reasoned that
even if the judgment were not final it could still be reviewed under Dom-
browski v. Pfister6 since, in Mills, exercise of the first amendment rights of
all newspaper editors in the state was being deterred by this state prosecu-
tion. Justice Harlan, in a lone dissent, felt that as long as there was a chance
for acquittal of petitioner the judgment was not final.
The holding in Mills follows the trend of departure, first appearing in
Clark v. Willard,7 from the early cases which construed the finality require-
ment to restrict the Court's investigation to the face of the judgment.8 In
1934 Clark v. Willard changed the "face of the judgment" rule by incorporat-
ing, by reference, the court's opinion into the judgment. The Clark case also
spells out the test for finality. The Court must look at both the judgment
and the opinion and see if there is anything more to be decided. If not,
then the judgment is final since the trial court has no discretion but must
follow the mandate of the higher court.
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd.9 and Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R.16 are cases emerging from the Clark test and, with Mills, form the
present theory of finality. In Richfield the California Supreme Court had
reversed, without directions, a judgment for the plaintiff. Under California
law this had the effect of ordering a new trial. The United States Supreme
Court held that there was no need for the plaintiff to go through the mo-
tions of a new trial since the state supreme court had ruled on all controlling
issues, thus leaving "nothing more to be decided"'" at the new trial. The
Pope case is strikingly similar to Mills, and was the precedent upon which
the majority in Mills justified Supreme Court review under the finality
5 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
6 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
7 292 U.S. 112 (1934).
8 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Bunn, 285 US. 169 (1932); Haseltine v. Central
Bank, 183 U.S. 130 (1901); Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U.S. 3 (1882); McComb v.
Commissioners, 91 U.S. 1 (1875).
o 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
10 345 U.S. 379 (1953).
11 Richfield OR Corp. v. State Ed., supra note 9, at 734.
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doctrine. Petitioner Pope was an employee of respondent and had been in-
jured in a railway accident in Georgia. Although a resident of Georgia, Pope
sued respondent in Alabama under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
Respondent brought suit in Georgia to enjoin Pope from prosecuting his
suit in an inconvenient forum. Petitioner demurred and his demurrer was
sustained by the trial court but reversed by the Georgia Supeme Court.
The petitioner argued that aside from arguments in favor of the demurrer
which had been overruled, he had no further factual or legal issues to present
to the court and thus the judgment should be regarded as final. The United
States Supreme Court held that petitioner's federal claim had been fully
and finally decided by the state courts and thus the Court could review
the decision under section 1257.12
Since the only action that had been taken in the Mills case also in-
volved a ruling on a demurrer, Pope and Mills can only be distinguished
on one ground. Pope was an equity action before a judge who was bound to
follow the mandate of the higher court while in Mills petitioner's case was a
criminal action triable before a jury, and it is possible that the jury might
have disregarded the trial judge's instructions and acquitted Mills.
In Mills the Court admittedly felt that the petitioner would be subjected
to an unnecessary burden if he were forced to go through the motions of
a trial once all of the issues in contention had been decided by the state
supreme court. As Justice Black said in Mills, "Such a roundabout process
would not only be an inexcusable delay of the benefits Congress intended to
grant by providing for appeal to this Court, but it would also result in a
12 Through the years several exceptions to the finality doctrine have been formu-
lated, one of which has some bearing here. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949) is the best example of the collateral order doctrine. In Cohen a federal dis-
trict court denied a corporation's motion that, pursuant to a state statute, the plaintiff
in a stockholder's derivative action be required to give security for reasonable expenses
of defendants. The Supreme Court held that the decision was final under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 because "This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too im-
portant to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen has
relevance in this discussion due to Construction Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542
(1963), a case cited in all three opinions in Mills. Curry was decided on dual grounds, the
Court saying that they could reach the same conclusion under either Cohen or Pope, supra
note 10. In Curry there was a question of whether a suit to enjoin a labor union from
picketing was under the jurisdiction of the Georgia state courts or the NLRB. The
Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that it had erred in failing to
grant the injunction. The United States Supreme Court held that even though the state
supreme court had merely authorized the issuance of a temporary injunction, thus
leaving a permanent order still to be issued by the trial court, its decision was final under
§ 1257 because not only was the injunction question wholly separable from and inde-
pendent of the merits, but also there was nothing more to be decided under Pope. Cf.
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
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completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial systems already
troubled by delays due to congested dockets."' 3
It may indeed be true that the Court has saved petitioner from a waste
of time in Mills, but on the other hand, as Justice Harlan pointed out in
his dissent, the appellant's counsel had conceded at oral argument that a
jury trial was still obtainable for Mills, and that it might result in an
acquittal.14 The real crux of the legal issues raised by the finality decision in
Mills seems to be the weight which the Court will give to the probability of
the petitioner suffering an adverse decision on retrial.
Harlan's dissent looked to the possibility of acquittal below as pre-
cluding court review, apparently on the thesis that the Court should con-
serve its energies and avoid interpretations of section 1257 which might
strain the limits of permissable court jurisdiction' 5 whenever a possibility
existed which might render an issue available. The majority, however,
apparently felt that the burden upon Mills of going to trial and the proba-
bility of the substantive issue again confronting the Court outweighed any
advantages to be gained by postponing adjudication.
The Court, in apparently weighing the probability of an adverse de-
cision to petitioner and the consequences thereof against present conservation
of its energies seemingly extended Pope and Constr. Laborers Union v.
Curry.'6 In those cases, which were civil cases, the trial judge was bound
to follow the mandate of the state appellate court, so that in fact only minis-
terial acts remained for retrial. How far this limited extension of Pope and
Curry will be carried, however, remains to be seen.
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-REQIRES APPLICATION OF FEDERAL Com-
mON LAw-Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966)-On July 14, 1958 King Faisal
II of Iraq was killed during a revolution that led to the establishment of a
republic in Iraq. At that time the King had a balance of 55,925 dollars and
4,008 shares of a Canadian corporation deposited with the Irving Trust
Company, a New York bank. On July 19, 1958 the new republican govern-
ment of Iraq adopted an ordinance confiscating all property of the Iraqi royal
dynasty on the grounds that it had been gained illegally. In August the United
States recognized the Republic. In October of 1958 a New York court ap-
pointed the defendant, First National City Bank, administrator of the late
King's New York assets. The Republic notified Irving Trust that it claimed
the late King's assets on the basis of the July 19 ordinance. Irving Trust
disregarded the claim and transferred the assets to First National City Bank
13 3,lls v. Alabama, supra note 5, at 217-18.
14 Id. at 222, n.1.
15 Id. at 222.
16 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
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as administrator. In March of 1962 the Republic brought suit against the
administrator bank in a New York federal district court to recover the bank
balance and the proceeds from the sale of the shares. The district court dis-
missed the complaint1 and the Republic appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal 2
The court of appeals held that under the act of state doctrine3 an-
nounced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Banco Nacional de
1 Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567 (SID.N.Y. 1965).
2 Republic of Iraq v. First Natl City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
3 The meanings assigned the term "act of state" are complex and varied. The Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law defined the term as follows:
§ 41 Act of Foreign State: General Rule
Except as otherwise provided by statute or the rules stated in §§ 42 and 43,
a court in the United States, having jurisdiction under the rule stated in § 19
to determine a claim asserted against a person in the United States or with
respect to a thing located there, or other interest localized there, will refrain
from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state by which that state has
exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests.
Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 41 (1965). The
court in the present case, however, also uses "act of state" to describe a purported
taking of property which is located within this country and outside the jurisdiction of
the country purporting to act.
The rule stated in the Restatement is in many cases modified by a recent federal
statute which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a deter-
mination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a
case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party
including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon
(or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an
act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including
the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsec-
tion: Provided, That this Subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case
in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with
respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to an
irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good
faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case
with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of
state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests
of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that
case with the court.
78 Stat. 1013 (1964), as amended, 22 U.S.CA. § 2370(e) (2) (Supp. 1965). This statute
does not apply to the present case because (1) the ordinance of July 19, 1958 was
issued before January 1, 1959, (2) it was not contended that the taking violated inter-
national law, and (3) the compensation principle made a part of "international law" by
the statute and set out elsewhere in the statute. 77 Stat. 386 (1963), as amended, 22
U.S.C.A. § 2370(e) (1) (Supp. 1965) protects only property owned by United States
citizens or United States corporations.
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Cuba v. Sabbatino;4 the question of the respect to be given a foreign act of
state was one of federal common law. The court further held that under
federal common law our courts would ordinarily give no effect to a con-
fiscatory act of a foreign state which purported to act upon property located
outside of that country and within the United States. This note will examine
that part of the court's opinion which held that the respect to be given
to a foreign act of state was exclusively a question of federal common law.
Normally a federal court sitting in a diversity case applies the law of the
state in which it sits,5 including that state's conflict of laws rules. 6 In those
instances in which modern federal common law exists, however, it displaces
inconsistent state laws in both the state and federal courts.7
The application of federal common law in the present case raises two
questions: (I) does Sabbatino require the application of federal common law
in the present case, and (2) if Sabbatino does not so require, could the reason-
ing and underlying policy considerations of Sabbatino be extended to justify
the application of federal common law in the present case? It is asserted that
the answer to both these questions is no.
The court of appeals held that the answer to the first question was yes.
The court said "The Supreme Court has declared that a question concerning
the effect of an act of state 'must be treated exclusively as an aspect of fed-
eral law.' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino .. ."8 Consequently, the
court of appeals did not consider the second question. The court did indicate,
however, that it saw good reason for an extension of federal common law to
the present case.
[TIhe exercise of discretion whether or not to respect a foreign act
of state affecting property in the United States is closely tied to our
foreign affairs, with consequent need for nationwide uniformity....
The required uniformity can be secured only by recognizing the ex-
pansive reach of the principle, announced by Mr. Justice Harlan in
Sabbatino, that all questions relating to an act of state are questions
of federal law, to be determined ultimately, if need be, by the
Supreme Court of the United States.9
Consequently, the court of appeals refused to consider the application of a
provision of the New York Decedents' Estate Law which provided that "the
law of the state or country, of which the decedent was a resident, at the time
of his death"' 0 regulated the disposition of the decedent's personal property
4 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
5 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
6 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
7 Friendly, "In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law," 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 383, 405-08 (1964).
8 Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, supra note 2, at 50.
9 Id. at 50-51.
10 N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 47. The provisions of the New York statute are quoted in
the opinion of the court of appeals in Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, supra
note 2, at 53.
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in New York. The court rejected the argument that New York would apply
the law of Iraq by asserting: "[W] e read Sabbatino to mean that New York
could not, by application of its choice of law rules, give a foreign act of state
an effect, whether less or greater, differing from that dictated by federal
law.)"1'
The court of appeals was not required to reach this conclusion by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino. Although the Supreme Court did
hold in Sabbatino that the respect to be given the act of state in the case
before it was a question of federal common law, it did not hold that all acts
of state questions were questions of federal common law. Instead it expressly
left open the possibility that some act of state questions were governed by
state law.
In Sabbatino the Supreme Court was considering the respect to be given
to the Cuban government's expropriation of sugar within its own territory.
The lower federal courts had refused to give any respect to the confiscatory
decrees because they considered the Cuban action to have been a violation of
international law.12 The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding
that, in order to avoid hindering the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment in the conduct of foreign affairs, acts of state affecting property within
the jurisdiction of the foreign state at the time of the act would be respected
by American courts even though the acts violated international law.'3
Before reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court examined the source
of the act of state doctrine. It rejected both the theory of early Supreme Court
cases that the doctrine was compelled by the nature of sovereign authority14
and the theory that the doctrine was international law. The Court held
instead that the doctrine was an aspect of the separation of powers' 5-a
means of preventing judicial interference with the foreign policy of the
executive branch. Since the doctrine could not successfully perform that
function if it were merely state law subject to state changes, the Court held
that the doctrine was federal law; 16 federal common law similar to a few
other "enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the states."' 7 The
Court said:
[W] e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a
basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively
as an aspect of federal law.' 8
1' Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, supra note 2, at 53.
12 Banco Nadonal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
and 307 F.2d 845, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1962).
13 Supra note 4, at 428.
14 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
15 Supra note 4, at 423-24.
16 Id. at 425-27.
17 Id. at 426.
18 Id. at 425.
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This is the language quoted by the court of appeals in the present case.' 9 The
Supreme Court qualified this statement, however, with a footnote:
At least this is true when the Court limits the scope of judicial in-
quiry. We need not now consider whether a state court might, in
certain circumstances, adhere to a more restrictive view concerning
the scope of examination of foreign acts than that required by this
Court.20
In this footnote the Supreme Court recognized two facts. First, the Court
recognized that an act of state problem would not always involve federal
separation of powers considerations.2 ' The problem could arise in other areas
of law. Although Sabbatino certaintly requires that federal law control when
the problem arises in a federal separation of powers context, Sabbatino does
not require2 2 that federal law control when the problem arises in other con-
texts.2 3 Second, the Court recognized that the rule it was adopting-a rule
that merely required American courts to respect foreign acts of state under
certain conditions despite international law objections-would be fully pro-
tected if federal common law merely required that much respect. The Court
had no reason to require that the states give no more respect than that rule
required.
The second question raised by the application of federal common law
in the present case is whether the reasoning of Sabbatino can be extended to
require such an application.
The Supreme Court applied federal common law in Sabbatino because
it found a special federal interest which required protection.2 4 Present day
federal common law consists of a series of "enclaves" 2 5 each created because
of a special federal interest.20 Either a federal statute is involved27 or the
federal government itself is involved in the subject matter.28 The only modern
10 Text accompaning note 8 supra.
20 Supra note 4, at 425 n.23.
21 Id. at 428.
22 See Levie, "Sequel to Sabbatino," 59 Am. J. Int'l L. 366, 368-69 (1965).
23 Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not decide in Sabbatino what law would
determine the standards by which a foreign act would be reviewed if review was per-
mitted or required. The court of appeals in the present case assumed that if whether a
foreign act could be reviewed was a federal common law question, the standards by
which it would be reviewed was also a federal common law question. That is only
one of the possibilities. Section 2370 (discussed supra note 3) shows another possibility.
It sets out a federal requirement for review in some cases but leaves the standards of
review open in part, perhaps to be determined by the states.
24 Supra note 4, at 425.
25 Id. at 426.
26 See Friendly, supra note 7, at 408-11.
27 See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act); Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) (National Bank Act).
28 See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); National
Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
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federal common law cases which do not involve special federal interests are
those concerning rights between the states.29
The question then is whether the application of federal common law in
the present case serves such a special federal interest. The decision in the
present case was based upon public policy grounds 0 and not upon federal
interest,3 1 but the court of appeals stated that there was a foreign policy
interest in the uniformity of such decisions that required that such decisions
be reached according to federal common law.8 2 This uniformity theory differs
from those in the Supreme Court cases cited by the court of appeals as sup-
porting it. In Sabbatino a federal law was needed and uniform obedience
to that federal law was therefore needed. 3 Similarly, in United States v.
Pink8 4 and United States v. Belmont35 an executive agreement was held to
be federal law and uniform obedience was therefore required.
There is an argument that can be made for a uniform law in act of state
cases. The law will be confusing and complicated for both litigants and the
courts if a particular act of state is accepted in one American state and
rejected in another. This is, however, an argument that can be made about
any area of American law. There is nothing to distinguish act of state cases
from other cases in this respect. Act of state cases are not distinguished by
the fact that they are far more likely to have foreign relations consequences,
for those consequences are due to the results in particular cases and not to
any contradictions between cases. If there is a federal interest in this area it
is in controlling the results in certain cases.
In the absence of a special federal interest in uniformity in this area, the
disadvantages of a piecemeal approach to uniformity through federal common
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941);
Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 303 U.S. 343 (1939).
29 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961) (escheat of un-
disbursed money paid for money orders); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (apportionment of waters in an interstate stream).
30 Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, supra note 2, at 51-52.
31 It is dear that the decision in the present case did not protect any executive
interest in having an act of Iraq respected since the decision was a refusal to respect an
Iraqi act. It could be argued that the present decision protected an executive interest in
keeping such acts from being respected, but that is a somewhat different interest from
a need to prevent insults to nations with whom the executive is negotiating, and Sabbatino
seems to hold that such an interest will not be protected by federal common law. The
rule adopted in Sabbatino compels lower courts, in the circumstances described by the
rule, to protect any possible interest in respect by always extending respect. It conse-
quently compels them to ignore, in the circumstances described by the rule, the possibility
of an executive interest in non-respect. Although it is upon this point that the Sabbalino
rule is reversed by section 2370 (discussed supra note 3), that statute does not affect the
present case.
32 Text accompanying note 8 supra.
3 Supra note 4, at 425.
34 315 US. 203 (1942).
35 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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law would seem to outweigh the advantage of simplicity which it offers. Two
of these disadvantages are the displacement of state authority and the denial
to both litigants and the courts of a developed and ascertainable body of law.
These disadvantages can be seen in the present case. Although the distri-
bution of a decedent's estate has long been recognized as a state activity,3 6
the court of appeals settled the problem central to the distribution of this
estate as a question of federal public policy and not as a question of New
York's decedent's estate laws.
Perhaps more important is the fact that state law may be displaced by
a federal common law that has not yet been developed. This unborn law will
be inadequate either to predict results or to reach them. Judge Friendly (the
author of the opinion in the present case) has noted that the pre-Erie
"general" federal common law had such inadequacies.31 The present day
American law of foreign relations is not well developed.38 Consequently, in the
present case the court of appeals could find less authority with which to
decide the federal common law relating to the Iraqi ordinance than it could
find to show that New York would not have given effect to the Iraqi ordinance
if this case had been decided as a question of state law.
The application of federal common law in the present case was not
required by either the decision in Sabbatino or by the reasoning that underlay
that decision. Sabbatino decided only that federal common law controlled
some act of state cases, not that it controlled all. The present case did not
involve a special federal interest such as underlay the decision in Sabbatino.
Therefore, the advantage of making act of state law uniform could be
weighed against, and outweighed by, the disadvantages of adopting uniform
law piecemeal.
36 See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank
and Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909).
37 "[Reckonability was small. One trouble was that the body of federal 'general'
law was so meagre." Friendly, supra note 7, at 406.
38 Henkin, "The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino," 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 805 (1964).
Although the Law of American Foreign Relations is as old as, perhaps older than,
the Constitution, it has not had the growth and attention enjoyed by other
parts of the law. As a result, the cases are few; the Supreme Court does not
build and refine steadily case by case; it develops no expertise or experts; the
justices have no dear philosophies; the precedents are old and reflect the spirit of
another day.
Id. at 831.
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ATTOINEYS-APPOINTED REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS-RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION-State V. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A2d 441 (1966)-In
State v. Rush,' an attorney appointed by the Burlington County Court to
defend an indigent charged with a non-capital offense sought recovery of
his fees and expenses. 2 The court denied recovery and on appeal, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that an appointed attorney is entitled to both
attorney's fees and expenses in any criminal prosecution. However, it pre-
termitted ordering the payment of fees for the purpose of giving the New
Jersey legislature opportunity to determine how the obligation could best
be met in similar future cases.
The court stated it is the exclusive responsibility of the judicial branch
to determine the obligations of the legal profession, and it is part of this
responsibility to determine whether an assigned attorney should be com-
pensated. It found statutory support for this judicial power3 and also im-
plied it is provided in the New Jersey Constitution, which states the supreme
court has jurisdiction over admission to the practice of law and discipline
of persons admitted.4
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in recent years that the
burden upon the bar has increased, and stipulated the state should help
bear the burden by compensating assigned counsel in all criminal prosecu-
tions. It argued the ultimate constitutional obligation to provide indigents
with counsel rests with the state, not the bar, and it is only reasonable that
the state share this burden with the bar. The court was faced with the
problem of finding a source from which to pay this expense.5 A New Jersey
statute provides that the necessary expenses of a criminal prosecution are
to be paid by the county.6 The court reasoned the expense of providing
counsel is a necessary expense, and accordingly within the statute.
7
The reasoning in the Rush case may reappear in the future as there
1 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
2 NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2A:163-1 (1953) provides compensation only in capital cases.
3 State v. Rush, supra note 1, at 411-12, 217 A.2d at 447.
4 N.J. Const. art. VI, § II provides: "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction
over the admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons admitted."
5 The majority view is that in the absence of statute providing for the payment
of these allowances, an attorney who has been assigned by the court cannot recover
compensation. Posey & Tompkins v. Mobile County, 50 Ala. 6 (1873); Case v. Shawnee
County, 4 Kan. 441 (1868); Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99 (1879); Pardee v.
Salt Lake County, 39 Utah 482, 118 Pac. 122 (1911).
6 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:158-7 (1953) provides: "All necessary expenses incurred
by the prosecutor for each county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction
of offenders against the laws shall . . . be paid by the county treasurer.. ..
7 It has been held that general statutes having reference to the expense incidental
to the arrest, trial, conviction, imprisonment, and support of persons of crime do not
require the payment of compensation to attorneys appointed to defend indigents. Elam
v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348 (1873); State v. Simmons, 43 La. Ann. 991, 10 So. 382 (1891);
Pardee v. Salt Lake County, 39 Utah 482, 118 Pac. 122 (1911); Presby v. Klickitat
County, 5 Wash. 329, 31 Pac. 876 (1892). This is the majority position and accordingly
the instant case adopts the minority view.
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are other states which have statutes providing for compensation only in capital
cases, 8 and a few states which have no statutory provision for compensating
assigned counsel.9 The courts in these states might be able to relieve their
respective bars of the increasing burden by applying the Rush rationale.
Compensation could be ordered in the absence of any express statutory
provision,' ° and if the courts are able to find a statute which could be in-
terpreted as including how the costs of compensation, once ordered, would
be met, counsel will be paid.-' If no such legislative will can be found, an
order for compensation by the court certainly should precipitate the neces-
sary legislation. If these legislatures refuse to enact a statute providing the
means for payment, the courts have available the ultimate sanction of re-
fusing to assign counsel, which could lead to wholesale dismissals of criminal
prosecutions on the Gideon v. Wainwright principle.' 2
Even more significant would be the application of the Rush reasoning
in those states where compensation provided by statute is token or inade-
quate,' 3 and a supreme court feels the burden on the bar is too great. Ohio
is a state where such reasoning could foreseeably be applied.' 4 A recent
survey in Ohio involving the defense of the poor recommended, "In regard
to the question of fees for court-appointed counsel, it is suggested that the
fees for trial of non-homicide felonies should be increased. . . .A statutory
maximum of $300 for the trial of a serious felony which may take many
days is most unjust."'Ir
In Ohio, admission to the bar16 and discipline of those admitted 17 is
8 1 Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts
16 (1965). In four states an assigned attorney is paid only in capital cases.
0 1 Silverstein, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16. Six states and the District of Colum-
bia do not compensate assigned counsel at all.
10 This presupposes that these state supreme courts have the exclusive power to
determine the bar's obligations. This power may be inherent, constitutional or statutory.
11 See note 5 supra.
12 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The state cannot prosecute indigent
defendants for felonies unless they are provided with counsel. If the court refuses to as-
sign an attorney, the indigent could claim his constitutional right of counsel, and the
prosecution would inevitably fail. The attorney's obligation is owed to the court, not the
state, and in the absence of a court order, he is free not to serve as counsel to the
indigent. This seems to be the reasoning that Rush applied in an attempt to pressure
the legislature into complying with the courts decision to compensate assigned counsel.
13 1 Silverstein, op. cit. supra note 8, at 32. Most states provide assigned attorneys
with little or no payment, especially in non-capital cases.
14 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.51 (Page Supp. 1966) provides: "(A) In a case
of murder in the first or second degree, and manslaughter in the first or second degree,
such compensation and expenses as the trial court may approve. (B) In other cases
of felony, such compensation as the trial court may approve, not exceeding three hundred
dollars and expenses as the trial court may approve."
15 3 Silverstein, op. cit. supra note 8, at 606.
16 The admission to the practice of law is determined by the Ohio Supreme Court
as a result of its inherent power and by virtue of statute. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio
St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4705.01 (Page 1954).
17 The Ohio Supreme Court has inherent and statutory power relating to the
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exclusively a judicial and not legislative power, and accordingly determined
by the Ohio Supreme Court. If the supreme court is faced with the issue
of deciding whether an assigned attorney should be forced, by reason of
statute, to settle with the maximum three hundred dollars for his services,
it could follow the Rush reasoning and hold the statute is merely "in aid
of the final judicial responsibility and to extend no further than the prescrip-
tion of minimum requirements, the judiciary remaining free to demand still
more."' 8 The judicial branch could accept such a statute in a "spirit of
comity,"' 9 or declare the statute void as an invasion of the court's inherent
power, contending the legislature has no real power to determine whether
an attorney is or is not compensated, or to set any guidelines for what pay-
ment he should receive.
The court in Rusk found a New Jersey statute which it interpreted as
providing for an attorney's expenses 20 Ohio has a similar statute,2 1 and
the supreme court arguably could interpret that part of the statute which
states the county, upon the order of the prosecuting attorney, shall provide
for expenses "incurred by him in the performance of his official duties and
in the furtherance of justice" 22 as including the expense of providing an in-
digent with counsel, without which a felony prosecution would halt and inev-
itably fail under Gideon v. Wainwright.23 Such an expense is obviously in-
curred in the furtherance of justice. This statute is not satisfactory to meet all
the future costs, but the Ohio Supreme Court, realizing this fact, could follow
the New Jersey Supreme Court and pretermit ordering payment until the
legislature has the opportunity to determine how the obligation could best
be met.
The Bar has historically served the poor at its own expense, but attorneys
are beginning to be adversely affected by the demands which the courts
are increasingly making. Judges are aware of the injustices that an attorney
discipline of attorneys admitted to practice in Ohio, and may provide by rule the pro-
cedure for such discipline. Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325,
148 N.E.2d 493 (1958). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4705.02 (Page 1954).
18 State v. Rush, supra note 1, at 410, 217 A.2d at 447.
19 Ibid.
20 See statute cited note 6 supra.
21 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 325.12 (Page 1953) provides: "There shall be allowed
annually to the prosecuting attorney, in addition to his salary and to the allowance
provided for by section 309.06 of the Revised Code, an amount equal to one half of
the official salary, to provide for expenses which may be incurred by him in the per-
formance of his official duties and in the furtherance of justice. Upon the order of
the prosecuting attorney, the county auditor shall draw his warrant on the county
treasurer, payable to the prosecuting attorney or such other person as the order desig-
nates, for such amount as the order requires, not exceeding the amount provided by
this section to be paid out of the general fund of the county."
22 Ibid.
23 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See note 12 supra.
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may face,24 and many seek a solution which would put the burden where
they believe it properly belongs-on the state. The Rush case illustrates
how a court may initiate this change. However, in the final analysis, the
legislature's cooperation is necessary in seeking means to relieve the Bar
of its burden, for only the legislature can establish and administer an efficient
system of defending the poor.
TORTS-PRoDucTs LIAmILITY-ILIED WARRANTY oF MERCHANTABILITY
-RUNS TO WORKER INJURED BY DEFECTIVE JoisT-Lonzrick v. Republic
Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,218 N.E.2d 185 (1966)-Plaintiff, a structural
ironworker, was employed by a subcontractor in the construction of a ware-
house. Defendant manufactured certain steel joists and sold them to the
general contractor. In 1960 a number of the joists, which had been installed
overhead, collapsed and fell on the plaintiff injuring him. Initially a demurrer
to plaintiff's petition alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability
was sustained. However, the court of appeals reversed and remanded holding
that the petition stated a cause of action in tort for breach of warranty.'
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed,2 holding that when a manufacturer
sells a product it implies that the product is of good and merchantable
quality and safe for its intended use, that this is a duty imposed by law
apart from any contract of sale, and when the duty is breached, as when
the product contains a defect which renders it dangerous when applied to
its intended use, and injury results, the injured party may sue in tort for
breach of implied warranty. However, the court did emphasize that this is
not absolute liability because the plaintiff must prove to the jury's satisfac-
tion that (1) the product was defective, (2) the product was defective at
the time of sale by the manufacturer, (3) the defect directly and proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury, and (4) the plaintiff's presence could reason-
ably be anticipated. Furthermore, the defendant may offer evidence to rebut
each of these elements as well as use the defenses of assumption of risk and
intervening cause.3
In reaching this decision, the court stated4 that the controlling prin-
ciples of law were established by Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.5 and
Inglis v. American Motors Corp.6 In each of these cases the purchaser re-
24 1 Silverstein, op. cit. supra note 8 at 33, which states: "The majority of judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers in virtually every state using an assigned counsel
system believes that lawyers should be paid a reasonable amount for their services."
1 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965).
2 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
3 Id. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
4 Id. at 235, 218 NXE.2d at 191.
5 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
6 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
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lied upon the manufacturer's representations in its national advertising
regarding the quality and merit of the product. More specifically the court
held in Rogers that an ultimate consumer injured because of a defect in the
product could maintain an action for damages against the manufacturer
without any direct contractual relationship between them. The Inglis case
extended the tort action to allow similar recovery for property damages.
However, since the Lonzrick case involved no representation by the de-
fendant and no reliance by the plaintiff, the court's citation of Rogers and
Inglis seems misplaced, and Lonzrick does in fact amount to the establish-
ment of a separate tort in Ohio rather than the extension of a prior one.
This decision establishes in Ohio what is generally known as "strict
liability," 7 namely, special liability of a seller for the physical harm caused
by a product in a defective condition when such defect makes the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or his property. Further-
more Lonzrick extends potential recovery to one who is not a consumer or
user but merely a bystander whose presence can be reasonably anticipated
by the manufacturer.
The court uses the term "defective" as synonymous with the concept
of "unmerchantable" in the implied warranty field, i.e., not fit for the or-
dinary use for which it is intended. This definition needs clarification be-
cause every unmerchantable product is not defective.8 Other courts have
allowed a defendant to defeat the plaintiff's case by showing that certain
"defects" and dangers are natural to the product,9 may be expected to be
found in it,'0 or are unsafe by nature and not liability producing so long as
there is adequate warning." There also is no defect when the buyer is
given what he demands, or when he uses the product abnormally.'
2
7 For discussions of strict liability, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
32 Ill. 2d 612,' 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Opponents of strict liability claim that implied
warranty is something less than strict liability and aspert that strict liability is hardly
accepted by anyone, e.g., Dalrymple, Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort, The
Defense Research Institute, Inc. 5 (1966). Other sources indicate that the name of
the tort is immaterial, e.g., Prosser, "Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer)," 69 Yale LJ. 1099, 1134 (1960); Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A,
comment m at 355-56 (1965).
8 See Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St. 2d 122, 214 NY..2d 213 (1966)
where a tank containing vapor of an explosive nature was found not defective.
9 See Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 NE..2d 309 (1964)
(fish bone found in fish chowder).
10 Cf., Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Manufacturers, Inc., 322 I. App. 586, 54 N.E2d
759 (1944) (bone in noodle soup mix not "natural").
11 See Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941) (plaintiff
was informed of the risk).
12 See Davis v. Coats Co., 255 Iowa 13, 119 N.W.2d 198 (1963) finding it un-
forseeable that a tire changing machine would be used to inflate tire; Phillips v. Ogle
Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951),
held it was forseeable that a chair would be used to stand on.
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Although the holding of Lonzrick is fairly clear, perhaps the most pro-
vocative aspect of the decision centers around why the Ohio Supreme Court
decided to recognize a tort action for breach of implied warranty (or strict
liability). The court's answer is that it was concerned with justice. It felt
it was unfair to deny recovery to a person suffering injury from a defective
product because of lack of a contractual relationship,13 and that liability
should not turn on whether plaintiff saw an advertisement, but on the crea-
tion of risk of harm to him. 4 The Ohio Uniform Sales Act extended war-
ranties only to direct purchasers. While the Ohio Commercial Code, which
became effective July 1, 1962, extended warranties to the members of the
purchaser's household and guests,' 5 it was of no help to Lonzrick because
(1) he could not qualify under the extension of warranty, and (2) any
rights and duties accrued under the Sales Act remained unaffected.16 Thus,
unless a change in the law was effected, Lonzrick, and others like him would
have no remedy for their injuries.
Chief Justice Taft in dissent argues that there was no necessity for
this new tort because the plaintiff could have brought a negligence action
and invoked res ipsa loquitur to prove that the defendant was negligent.' 7
However, res ipsa loquitur is of no help in situations where the product
has been handled by parties other than the defendant, and plaintiff must
not only prove defendant's negligence but must disprove causation by the
other parties. Furthermore, in a negligence action defendant's proof of due
care may defeat plaintiff's recovery;' 8 under the Lonzrick rationale de-
fendant's due care is not a defense.
A more sophisticated answer is "risk spreading" which is said to be
the main reason for strict liability.' 9 This argument maintains that those
who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet the con-
sequences, whereas the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business 2 0 Opponents
insist that risk spreading creates liability without fault which is contrary
to our society's normal expectations, that it is a vehicle of socialization be-
cause the manufacturers and sellers are merely made collectors from the
consumers and users, that the manufacturers and sellers will no longer have
economic motivation to exercise due care in order to prevent liabilities, and
that such a change of the law in the form of new public policy should be
legislatively decided.21
13 6 Ohio St. 2d at 231, 237, 240, 218 N.E.2d at 189, 192, 194 (1966).
14 Id. at 237, 218 NE.2d at 192.
15 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.31 (Page 1962).
16 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1301.15 (Page Supp. 1965).
17 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 242, 218 N.E.2d 185, 195 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
18 Prosser, "Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)," 69
Yale LJ. 1099, 1116 (1960).
19 Id. at 1120.
20 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (concurring opinion).
21 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 248-50, 218 N.E.2d 185,
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In order to answer this we must briefly look to the basis of tort law.
While its objective is to determine whether to compensate and how, under-
lying the body of tort law is an awareness that the need for compensation
is not a sufficient basis for an award, because compensation does not erase
a loss, but only shifts it. Doing justice is the main objective, and it has
long been assumed that this requires a wrongdoer to compensate his inno-
cent victim, which, in turn, means shifting the loss from the one who has
innocently suffered to another whose fault has caused the injury. However,
the standard of fault has changed, especially through the use of an objective
standard, and courts no longer adhere to a principle of basing awards on
moral fault.22 Rather there is a realization that a broader principle for
awards should be invoked, that is, a principle of repair of injuries incurred
rather than inflicted, where they arise in the course of carrying on an activity
which has a probability of injury to others.2 3 Manufacturers should not be
asked to bear the loss simply because as a group they have greater wealth,
but because as a group they have a greater capacity to bear responsibility
for a loss and because it is fair to require that they bear a share of the loss
caused by their activities.2 4 Looking through the eyes of the innocent victim,
can one say this is unjust? If the standard of fault has changed, and the
courts now feel that the victim of defective products has a just cause, why
should he not be allowed to recover?
As a general rule manufacturers' costs are ultimately paid by the con-
sumer. Why some argue that the adoption of strict liability will decrease
the manufacturers' efforts to use care in production is unclear. Where the
manufacturer self-insures, he is directly affected by any liability claims.
Where he uses commercial insurance, he is still subject to being rated, and
bad risks are not particularly wanted in the insurance industry because it
is well known that insurance rates must go up with an increased number
of claims. In either event, it would seem that the manufacturer will still
be concerned with producing better and safer products.
Whether strict liability should be adopted by judicial decision or
legislative action is an issue upon which the court in Lonzrick strongly
disagreed. Although the dissent found legislative intent not to invoke strict
liability in Ohio,25 the majority considered the policy changes created
through judicial decisions26 in Rogers and Inglis and seemed to conclude
199-200 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83
RI. 51, 57, 112 A.2d 701, 704 (1955); Dalrymple, Brief Opposing Strict Liability
in Tort, The Defense Research Institute, Inc. 16-17 (1966).
22 See Keeton and O'Donnell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 242-50
(1965). Query: How else can courts hold an insane person responsible for his negli-
gence?
23 See Pound, "The Problem of the Exploding Bottle," 40 B.U.L. Rev. 167, 185
(1960).
24 See note 22 supra.
25 6 Ohio St. at 250-52, 218 N.E.2d at 200-01 (1966).
26 Id. at 232-35, 218 N.E.2d at 189-91.
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that development of products liability law was a proper subject for both the
judiciary and the legislature 27
Since a major part of our law has evolved through judicial decisions,
it clearly is untrue that lawmaking is strictly a legislative function. Some
contemporary judges view it as a matter of individual decision whether to
modify rules in the absence of legislative action, fill a legislative gap, further
extend a principle or maintain existing law. Possibly it is unwise to judicially
act when a legislature has recently debated and failed to enact a bill on
the subject.2 8 However, the absence of a safety law imposing punishment
for the sale of defective products cannot be regarded as the Ohio legislature's
intent to deny compensation to an innocent victim. Even when enacting
public safety laws, the legislature has usually left civil actions to the courts.2 9
In the torts field which has been overwhelmingly the result of judicial crea-
tion and elaboration it is natural for the court to develop the law and
modify or abolish doctrines that have become incompatible with modern
social facts and public policy. Besides it cannot be denied that many urgent
law reforms are not tackled by legislatures because of low political priority.30
Little can be said beyond Lonzrick about the present status of Ohio's
strict liability law. Absence of a reference to the Ohio Commercial Code
may be some indication that the court plans strict liability to be an entirely
independent action.31 Alternatively, the court may insist that immediate pur-
chasers proceed on warranties under the code and comply with code re-
quirements, or may make a distinction between commercial transactions
and situations involving ordinary purchasers unable to match the sellers'
bargaining powers.3
2
The issues created by Lonzrick, but left unanswered, center around
what plaintiffs will be included within the "persons whose presence can be
reasonably anticipated" standard and whether strict products' liability will
be extended to wholesalers, distributors or retailers.
27 Id. at 239, 218 N.E.2d at 194.
28 Friedman, "Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking," in Essays on Juris-
prudence from the Columbia Law Review 101, 109-19 (1963).
29 While many safety laws, such as pure food and drug, and liquor control laws,
provide penalties in case of violation, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3715.99, 4399.99
(Page 1965), they usually do not provide civil relief. Ohio Rev. Code § 4399.08 (Page
1965) merely states that a suit for damages shall be a civil action. In order to provide
remedies for persons damaged because of violation of these safety laws, courts have had
to hold that violation of the statute was negligence per se; see Schell v. DuBois, 94
Ohio St. 93, 103, 113 N.E. 664, 667 (1916) (interpreting a traffic ordinance).
30 See Friedman, note 28 supra.
31 The court may then be permitting a portion of the code relating to products
liability to be displaced by case law rules of strict liability. See Shanker, "Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on
Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers," 17 W. Res. L. Rev.
5 (1965).
32 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 27, 403 P.2d 145, 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
30 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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Over the years the proponents of strict liability have concentrated
upon the consumer.83 Perhaps Lonzrick is another indication3 4 that it is
time to change this policy and recognize that all those whose injuries are
proximately caused by defective products should also be compensated.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRONIc ALCOHOLISM-CoNVICTION-CRuEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNIS mxNT-Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir.
1966)-The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously held the
criminal conviction of chronic alcoholics for public intoxication to be a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.' The petitioner, Joe Driver, was arrested in North Carolina
for public intoxication,2 and because of his record of previous arrests, was
sentenced to two years imprisonment. His appeal to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina was unsuccessful, and after his petition in federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, the Court of Appeals unani-
mously reversed. It held when public intoxication becomes involuntary as
the result of the disease of chronic alcoholism, to stamp such a person as
criminal constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
The court relied upon Robinson v. California,3 which held punishment
of a narcotics addict for being an addict is cruel and unusual punishment. 4
Driver used Robinson for two propositions, first, unwilled and ungovernable
public appearances by the victim of a disease cannot be criminally punished,
since the victim has no control over such appearances. The second, which in
many ways is merely an extension of the first, is that in prohibiting a state
from punishing a person for having a disease, Robinson necessarily prohibits
punishment of the compulsive symptoms of the disease. In other words, if
a state cannot punish a person for having a common cold, 5 then neither can
33 Prosser, "The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)," 50 Minn.
L. Rev. 791, 819-20 (1966); Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A, comment o at 356-57
(1965).
34 See Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965)
where the court allowed a "bystander" (a boy hurt by a defective shell fired by his
brother) to maintain an action for breach of implied warranty.
1 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
2 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335(12)(Supp. 1965) provides: "In Carteret, Craven,
Durham . . . counties, by a fine, for the first offense, of not more than fifty dollars
($50.00), or imprisonment for not more than thirty days; for the second offense within
a period of twelve months, by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00),
or imprisonment for not more than sixty days; and for the third offense within any
twelve months' period such offense is declared a misdemeanor, punishable as a misde-
meanor within the discretion of the court."
3 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
4 Id. at 667.
5 Id. at 667.
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it punish him for sneezing in public. Implications of the case differ greatly,
depending upon which of these rationales is stressed. It is true to a certain
extent that the compulsive as symptomatic language tempers the involuntari-
ness rationale, and how broadly or narrowly compulsive as symptomatic is de-
fined will in many cases determine the result. The Driver opinion gave no
clue as to how compulsive as symptomatic is to be interpreted, and in this
respect each court will have to make an independent judgment.
Medical authorities have long contended that certain persons not legally
insane under the McNaghten test 6 may nonetheless be unable to make free
choices.7 A good example are psychopaths, 8 or as they are now called, socio-
paths. Under both Driver's propositions, in many instances it would be cruel
and unusual to punish such persons. It could be argued their flagrant viola-
tions of sexual conduct laws are acts both compulsive as symptomatic of
their disease, and acts over which they have no control. Contrary to such
a contention would be a pre-Robinson case, Leland v. Oregon,9 which held
sole use of the McNaghten test does not deny due process.' 0 However, if
Driver correctly relied upon Robinson as a basis for its conclusion that con-
duct must be willed and governable in order to be subject to penal sanctions,
it would seem to provide a defense in this area. Likewise, to punish such
persons for their behavior might be viewed as a punishment for a condition
of mental abnormality over which they have no control.
If Driver's proposition that the chronic alcoholic has a disease and does
not drink voluntarily is accepted, as today's medical knowledge insists it
should," it could certainly be argued the chronic alcoholic drinks with as
little volition as one who is forced to drink by another. The chronic alco-
holic's intoxication might be analogized to involuntary intoxication, which
relieves the criminality of acts committed under its influence.' 2 In fact, the
alcoholic would not have to be intoxicated in order for certain of his offenses
to be excused from punishment. His craving for alcohol and involuntary
and ungovernable need for it might excuse various offenses he might commit
to satisfy his thirst. For example, an alcoholic who steals a bottle of wine
from a store could argue he did not voluntarily take the wine-that his
taking of it was an unwilled and ungovernable act because he no longer has
any control over his need. The difficult question is whether or not such acts
6 See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
7 Examples are certain of the mentally ill such as sociopaths, children, and those
of limited knowledge. Watson, "A Critique of the Legal Approach to Crime and Cor-
rection," 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 611, 625 (1958).
8 Id. at 626. See also Karpman, The Sexual Offender And His Offenses 6 (1954).
0 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
10 Id. at 800-01.
11 See 2 Cecil & Loeb, A Textbook Of Medicine 1625 (10th ed. 1959); Gutt-
macher & Weihofen, Psychiatry And The Law 318-22 (1952); Jellinek, The Disease
Concept Of Alcoholism 41-44 (1960).
12 See Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882); Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md.
412, 143 A.2d 70 (1958); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923).
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease. If emphasis is placed on
Driver's involuntariness rationale, and the standardless compulsive as symp-
tomatic language is construed broadly enough, perhaps such an argument
could be successfully presented.
In comparing various crimes connected with diseases such as alco-
holism or drug addiction, it can be seen that some are more directly related
than others to the disease. For example, although public intoxication may be
caused by chronic alcoholism, it does not necessarily follow from it, as many
chronic alcoholics do not become publicly intoxicated. The possession of
narcotics, however, is definitely entailed by the addiction, for arguably a per-
son cannot be a drug addict without at some time possessing narcotics. Thus,
to punish a non-volitional addict for possession of narcotics seems to be a
punishment for the disease itself much more directly than public intoxica-
tion statutes punish a chronic alcoholic for his disease. A court would not
have to go as far as did Driver to say that to punish a non-volitional addict
for possession is to punish him for the disease itself.
Robinson v. California held it was cruel and unusual to punish a person
for having a disease, and Driver extended this prohibition to the involuntary
symptoms of the disease. Driver seems to have reasoned that to punish a
person for those acts which are products of a disease is in fact to punish
him for the disease itself, and on the basis of Robinson this is unconstitu-
tional. The cases in which the alcoholic's acts are products of his condition
will have to be individually decided, and if this is taken as the relevant
question, a Durham test 13 for insanity could be constitutionally required.
The greatest bar in this area is the Leland decision, and whether or not
Leland was repudiated by Robinson's reasoning is a question yet unanswered.
Although Driver achieves a laudable result in the instant case (if, of
course, adequate treatment facilities are made available), it furthers much
of the confusion fostered by Robinson. If it is true that the eighth amend-
ment's "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society 14" demand that a person not be branded a criminal for acts over
which he has no control, then many changes in the area of criminal responsi-
bility will be necessitated by the decision. However, the changes called for
by the rationale of Driver may be too drastic for current criminal law applica-
tion.
TRUSTS-DocNE OF WORTHIER TITLE-HELD NOT RULE OF CON-
STRUCTIoN-Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966)-
Anna P. Hatch, settlor, established a spendthrift trust in 1923 under which
she received a life income along with a testamentary power of appointment
over the corpus in default of which the corpus was to go to her statutory
next of kin. Settlor retained no power to revoke, alter, amend or modify
13 See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
14 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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the trust. When the trustee refused to grant the settlor's request for an
additional 5,000 dollar annual stipend, she brought this action to obtain
modification of the trust in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. Summary judgement was granted against the settlor from
which she appealed to the court in the instant case.'
Settlor based her right to recovery on the doctrine of worthier title.
The doctrine states that a grant of a remainder to the heirs of the settlor
is void leaving a reversion in the settlor rather than a remainder in his
heirs. Invoking this doctrine, settlor claimed she was the sole beneficiary
of the trust, and thus, she could revoke or modify it. In the present case,
the court, affirming the district court's decision, held that the doctrine of
worthier title was no part of the law of trusts of the District of Columbia
either as a rule of law or as a rule of construction 2 In so holding, the court
rejected the present principles regarding the doctrine.3
The doctrine of worthier title had its origin in the English feudal system
where it existed as a rule of law until its abrogation by statute in 1833.
A few of the earlier cases in the United States applied the doctrine as a
rule of lawY However, in Doctor v. Hughes,6 the leading case on this issue,
1 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2 Id. at 564. The court further held that the doctrine of worthier title would not
be applied when the settlor alleged that it was impossible to obtain consent to revocation
from all the beneficiaries since some of them might still be unborn. The court stated
that it had as an incident to its jurisdiction an inherent power to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent and protect the inte;est of possible unborn heirs. The appoint-
ment of a guardian ad item in such a case is a well established procedure in a majority
of jurisdictions where it is authorized either by statute or as an incident to the court's
general power of equity. Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 248, 124 P.2d 659, 665,
cert. denied sub norn., Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Mabry, 317 U.S. 670 (1942);
Gunnel v. Palmer, 370 Il1. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202 (1938); Restatement, Property, § 182,
comment e (1936).
3 Jurisdictions viewing the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of construction
include: California: Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal. 2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018
(1949); Massachusetts: National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53
N.E.2d 113 (1944); Missouri: Davidson v. Davidson, 350 Mo. 639, 167 S.W.2d 641
(1943); New Jersey: Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Parfner, 135 N.J. Eq. 133, 37 A.2d
675 (1944); New York: Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919);
Richardson v. Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E.2d 54 (1948); In re Burchell's Estate,
299 N.Y. 351, 87 N.E.2d 293, reh. denied 300 N.Y. 498, 88 N.E.2d 725 (1949); Ohio:
How the courts of Ohio will treat the doctrine of worthier title is not yet clear. Beach
v. Busey, 34 Ohio Op. 204, 156 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 802
(1947); Kuhn v. Jackman, 32 Ohio App. 164, 166 N.E. 247 (1929) (citing the rule
stated but deciding on other grounds); 20 Ohio Jur. 2d Estates § 132 (1956); Wash-
ington: McKenna v. Seattle-First Natl Bank, 35 Wash. 2d 662, 214 P.2d 664 (1950);
See also Restatement (Second), Trusts § 127, comment b (1959).
4 Act for the Amendment of the Law of Inheritance, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4 C. 106, § 3.
r Miller v. Fleming, 18 D.C. Rep. (7 Mackey) 139 (1889); Brolasky's Estate,
302 Pa. 439, 153 At. 739 (1931).
6 Supra note 3.
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Judge Cardozo's opinion established the principle that the doctrine of
worthier title existed not as a rule of property but as a rule of construction.7
If this rule exists only as a vestige of the common law, the court would
seem to have made a sound decision in totally rejecting the doctrine. How-
ever, the justification for the continued application of the, doctrine as a rule
of construction is generally stated to be that its application represents the
probable intention of the settlor. That is, it is improbable that the owner
of property would actually intend to strip himself of control over this prop-
erty and create in his prospective heirs an indestructible future interest
which would be detrimental to his own interests.8 On this basis of probable
intention, a majority of courts will apply the doctrine as a rule of construc-
tion unless the instrument of conveyance gives some clear expression of
intention to the contrary.
The court in Hatch acknowledged the above reasoning, but stated that a
significant purpose of the settlor of such a trust may be a desire to benefit
his heirs, and an adult with a good idea of whom his heirs will be probably
means what he says when he states "remainder to my heirs."9
There have been various inconsistent New York decisions resulting
from the two possible interpretations of this clause. 0 Although these cases
seem to present a "hodgepodge" of irreconcilable decisions, common to all
are instances of the New York courts' reliance upon certain indications
of intent found within the trust instrument." These indicia which were
deemed sufficient to overcome the doctrine's presumption of a reversion
were also present in the trust instrument of Hatch, but they were not re-
ferred to nor relied upon by this cotrt.
For example, in Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co.,12 the New York
Court of Appeals relied upon the completeness of the provisions disposing
of the trust corpus as evidence of the settlor's intent to create a remainder
in his heirs. In this case, three settlors established a trust for a husband
and wife and provided that upon the death of these two beneficiaries, the
trustees were to convey the corpus to the settlors, if living. But, if any had
died, his share was to go to his testamentary appointees and, in default
of appointment, to such persons as would be his heirs under the statutes
of descent of New York. The court held that the completeness of the dis-
position of the corpus was sufficient evidence of the settlor's intent to create
a remainder in the heirs. Hence, the presumption, created by the doctrine
that a reversion was intended, was overcome. In the present case, there is
the same completeness of disposition. The corpus is to benefit the settior for
life and then pass as she appoints by will, and in default of appointment,
7 See cases cited note 2 supra.
8 Restatement, Property § 314, comment c (1940).
9 Hatch v. Riggs Natl Bank, supra note 1, at 563.
10 Id. at 564.
11 But see Verrall, "The Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Questionable Rule of
Construction," 6 U.C-LA.L. Rev. 371 (1959).
12 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929).
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it is to pass to her statutory next of kin.13 If the District of Columbia court
had made a search for intent, this factor would have merited its con-
sideration.
Another element of the trust which the District of Columbia court
might have considered, if it had searched for indications of the settlor's
intent, is made evident in the Maryland case of Peter v. Peter.14 The settlor
set up a spendthrift trust reserving a life estate in income and a testa-
mentary power of appointment in default of which the corpus was to go
to his heirs at law. He explicitly denied himself any power to alienate the
same. The Maryland Court of Appeals construed the express denial of any
power of alienation in the settlor to evidence an intention to create a re-
mainder in the heirs by purchase.15 If the District of Columbia court had
made a determination of the settlor's intent, this same reasoning could apply
to the spendthrift provision against alienation as found in the present case. 1
Finally, the court in Hatch might have noted that the trust provided
that in default of exercise of the testamentary power of appointment by the
settlor, the corpus shall pass to settlor's "next of kin."'17 "Next of kin"
is a more restrictive term than "heirs at law"' 8 and would indicate an in-
tention on the part of the settlor to confer upon certain specified persons a
definite interest which could not be deprived them, except by a testamen-
tary appointment.
Certainty of written expression and the probability of less litigation are
reasons cited by the court in support of total rejection of the doctrine as
a rule of construction.19 Free alienability of property and facilitation of the
revocability of trusts are reasons favoring retention of the doctrine. 0 In
attempting to determine the relative weight of these reasons, no one argu-
ment decisively outbalances the other. Therefore, applicability of the doc-
trine must depend upon an accurate determination of the settlor's intent,
Controversies concerning a grantor's intent would have arisen when he
limited a conveyance to his heirs or next of kin whether or not a rule
13 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, supra note 1, at 560.
14 136 Md. 157, 110 At. 211 (1920). See Reno, "Doctrine of Worthier Title As
Applied In Maryland," 4 Md. L. Rev. 50, 68 (1939).
15 Peter v. Peter, supra note 14 at 172, 110 Ad. at 217.
16 Hatch v. Riggs Natl Bank, supra note 1, at 560. The provision referred to reads:
"without the power to her to anticipate, alienate or charge the same..
17 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, supra note 1, 560.
18 Dalton v. White, 129 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Brief for Appellee, pp. 4-5,
Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, supra note 1; Black, Law Dictionary 1194 (4th ed. 1951);
Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1180 (1928).
'9 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, supra note 1, at 564. E.g., Simes, "Fifty Years of
Future Interests," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 749, 756 (1937); Verra, "The Doctrine of Worthier
Title: A Questionable Rule of Construction," 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 371 (1959); Note, 48
Yale L.J. 874 (1939).
20 Restatement, Property § 314, comment c (1940); Warren, Book Review, 2 U.
Toronto L.J. 389, 391-2 (1938); Warren, "A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs," 22
Texas L. Rev. 22 (1943).
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presuming a reversion had ever existed. The modern and more equitable
trend of litigation is toward a realistic search for genuine intention, and
application of this doctrine may be required in order to further a grantor's
true intent. There is an abundance of evidence in the present case supporting
an intent to create a remainder in the settlor's heirs. But, the court totally
abandoned the search for intention. In this case, total rejection of the doc-
trine as a rule of construction seems to be an unnecessary and an uncom-
promising departure from the present majority position.
INCOOME TAX-FusTRATIoN DocTRNu-DoEs NOT CONTROL THE DE-
DUCTIBILITY or LEGAL ExPENxsES-Comissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687
(1966)-In 1956 respondent, a securities dealer, was convicted of viola-
tions of three federal fraud statutes.' In the course of his unsuccessful de-
fense of that criminal prosecution, respondent paid 22,964 dollars for legal
services. On his federal income tax return for 1956 he claimed a deduction
for that amount under section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.2 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and was sustained by
the Tax Court.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.4
On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding that
legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution,
if otherwise deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, are
not to be disallowed on public policy grounds.
In allowing the deduction the Court overturned a well established
principle. Legal expenses, if incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a
criminal prosecution, had been consistently 6 held by lower courts to be
nondeductible either because they were avoidable and hence unnecessary, or
because the allowance of such a deduction would frustrate public policy.7
I Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77 q(a) (1964); 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
2 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1964):
"(a) In general.
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ...
3 Walter F. Tellier, T.C. Memo. 1963-212, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062, 32 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1207 (1963).
4 Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
5 Commissioner v. Telier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
6 Note, however, that between 1944 and 1962 the official position of the Com-
missioner, as expressed in G.C.M. 24377, 1944 Cum. Bull. 93, was that legal expenses
incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal (anti-trust) prosecution were de-
ductible. The Commissioner reversed his position in Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 Cum.
Bull. 50.
7 Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1963); C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C.
1417 (1951). There is also some support for this position in Commissioner v. Hein-
inger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 n.8 (1943); Burroughs Bldg. Materials Co. v. Commissioner,
47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
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Although the Commissioner conceded that the expenses involved were "or-
dinary and necessary" within the meaning of section 162(a), the Court
nonetheless discussed the issue, thereby adding substance to the Commis-
sioner's concession. The Court defined "necessary" as "'appropriate and
helpful' for 'the development of the [taxpayer's] business' "s and stated that
the function of "ordinary" was merely to distinguish non-capital from capi-
tal expenditures. 9 Having established that the "ordinary and necessary"
provision was to be broadly construed, the Court then concluded that the
legal fees by respondent were clearly ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses.
With respect to denying the deduction of legal expenses on public
policy grounds, the Court again made an unequivocal statement of its posi-
tion: "No public policy is offended when a man faced with serious criminal
charges employs a lawyer to help in his defense."'1
The Supreme's Court decision in Tellier is founded upon two basic
policies. The Court began with the "proposition that the federal income
tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing."' This policy
of taxing net income has, however, three exceptions with respect to deduc-
tions. One of them, and that relied upon by the Commissioner, is based upon
public policy.12 To overcome the Commissioner's claim that allowance of
the deduction would mean subsidizing the cost of defense,13 the Court in-
voked the other policy basic to the Tellier decision, namely, that of en-
couraging effective assistance of counsel. After acknowledging that Gideon v.
Wainwright'4 established a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
counsel, Mr. Justice Stewart continued: "In an adversary system of crim-
inal justice, it is a basic of our public policy that a defendant in a criminal
case have counsel to represent him."' 5
Commissioner v. Tellier thus leaves no room for future decisions that
legal expenses, otherwise deductible, are nondeductible on public policy
grounds. The expenses involved were incurred in the unsuccessful defense of
a criminal prosecution. These are the very elements upon which the Commis-
8 383 U.S. at 689, quoting from Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
9 383 U.S. at 689.
10 Id. at 694.
11 Id. at 691.
12 The other exceptions are specific legislation and "a precise and longstanding
Treasury Regulation." 383 U.S. at 693.
13 Judge Learned Hand had made much the same argument: "Indeed, to hold
[that legal expenses are always deductible] would be to subsidize the obduracy of those
offenders who were unwilling to pay without a contest and who therefore added im-
penitence to their offence." Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713
(2d Cir. 1949).
'4 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 383 U.S. at 694. Allowance of the deduction may, however, be required by more
than policy. Since Gideon v. Wainwright is constitutionally based, disallowance of the
deduction may be unconstitutional if it interferes with the right to effective assistance
of counsel.
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sioner had focused in holding attorney's fees nondeductible.1 6 Moreover, by
establishing that public policy favored expenditures made for the purpose of
obtaining legal assistance in defending against a criminal prosecution, the
Court completely removed such counsel fees from the scope of the public
policy exception.1 7
While Tellier forecloses the legal expenses aspect of the frustration
doctrine, it is also significant in that it provides a basis for forecasting the
technique the Court will employ in resolving other frustration doctrine
issues, such as the deductibility of unlawful expenses and penalties. The
importance of this latter feature of the Tellier decision arises from the fact
that two previous Supreme Court frustration doctrine cases, Commissioner
v. Sullivan 6 and Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner,1" have been looked
upon as being inconsistent, even irreconcilable,20 with respect to the manner
in which deductibility is to be determined. As the Tellier Court cites both
Sullivan and Tank Truck Rentals with approval, reconciliation is made not
only desirable but also necessary. Close analysis of the Tellier decision, in
conjuction with Sullivan and Tank Truck Rentals, does reveal a pattern of
decision consistent with the result of all three cases.
The apparent conflict between Sullivan and Tank Truck Rentals is
clear enough. In Sullivan the Supreme Court upheld a deduction of rent and
wages claimed by the proprietor of a gambling establishment even though
the rent and wage payments were illegal under state law. In Tank Truck
Rentals, on the other hand, the Court stated that "the test of nondeduc-
tibility always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting
from allowance of the deduction." 21 The apparent inconsistency of the two
cases is highlighted by the declaration in Tank Truck Rentals that "certainly
the frustration of state policy is most complete and direct when the expendi-
ture for which deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute.122 Thus if
the Tank Truck Rentals "test of nondeductibility" is applied to the deduc-
tion sought in Sullivan, disallowance thereof would seem to follow as a
matter of course. As the deduction was permitted, one can only conclude
16 Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 50.
17 The response of the Internal Revenue Service to Tellier is found in T.I.R.-861.
It is there stated that the Service
will apply the principle of the Tellier decision and will allow as deductions
attorneys' fees and related legal expenses paid or incurred in the unsuccessful
defense of a prosecution for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or in
the unsuccessful defense of claims under § 4A of the Clayton Act or the Federal
False Claims Act, provided such expenditures are otherwise deductible under
the Code as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
18 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
19 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
20 Note, 5 N.Y.L.F. 204, 213-14 (1959); Note, 72 Yale L.J. 108, 137-38 (1962).
See also, Lindsay, "Tax Deductions and Public Policy," 41 Taxes 711, 717-18 (1963);
"The Supreme Court 1957 Term," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 116 (1958).
21 356 U.S. at 35.
22 Ibid.
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that the severity and immediacy of the frustration is not the only test of
nondeductibility. Rather the Sullivan case and the emphasis given in Tellier
to the policy of taxing only net income 3 indicate that the relationship of
the expense to net income is a factor of considerable determinative im-
portance. Judging from the construction of the Tellier opinion, it appears
that the policy of taxing net income is balanced against the possibility of
frustration of public policy, with focus upon the relevant state or federal
statute for an expression of the latter policy. The relationship of the expense
to the net income of the business must be studied, including, perhaps, con-
sideration of the regularity of the expense, of whether it is productive of
income, and of whether it is necessary to the functioning of the business.
If there is a close relationship between the expense and net income, the policy
of taxing only net income will have greater influence on the disposition of
the case than if the relationship is a vague one. Balanced against the policy
of taxing net income is the possibility of frustration of public policy. In
Sullivan the net income policy prevailed because the expenses involved (rent
and wages) were regular, necessary, and directly related to the production
of income. The public policy was expressed only in a generally worded state
statute24 which made no express reference to the expenses sought to be
deducted. On the other hand, in Tank Truck Rentals, a penalties case, the
net income policy, while deserving considerable weight according to the
facts of the case, was outweighed by public policy considerations, since al-
lowance of the deduction would have mitigated the statutorily imposed sanc-
tion and tended "to destroy the effectiveness of the State's maximum weight
laws." 25
While any balancing process is difficult to administer, recognition of the
net income-public policy balancing test suggested by Tellier-should lead
to greater uniformity in an area of the law marked by inconsistency.
CIVIL RIGHTS-PuBLic ACCOMMODATIONS-CORPORATION FOR PRQFIT-
STATUTORY EXEMPTION FOR PRIVATE CLUBS INAPPLICABLE-Clover Hill
Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 47 NJ. 25, 219 A2d 161 (1966)-Plaintiff, a
Negro veterinarian, brought an action against Clover Hill Swimming Club,
Inc. alleging that he had been denied membership in the club because of his
race. Clover Hill is privately owned and is operated for profit. It is organized
on the plan of a private membership club but it is controlled and operated by
the stockholders, not by the members. After establishing that Clover Hill had
engaged in discriminatory practices, the State Director of the Division on
Civil Rights concluded that the club was a place of public accommodation and
23 383 U.S. at 691.
24 ]MI. Laws 1887, p. 95, since repealed and replaced by Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38,
§§ 28-1 and 28-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
25 356 U.S. at 35.
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directed it to admit the plaintiff. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed.1
The New Jersey "Law Against Discrimination" specifically exempts
"bona fide clubs" and other "distinctly private" accommodations.2 In addi-
tion, thirty five states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar
statutes, and in all cases private clubs are exempted either explicitly or by
reference to public facilities.3
In attempting to apply the public accommodation statutes, the various
jurisdictions have relied on a number of legal principles and rules of inter-
pretation to distinguish between public and private accommodations. Many
of the earlier cases' interpreted the word "public" in a very narrow sense,
often relying on common law definitions which distinguished a public accom-
modation from a private business.4 In those jurisdictions with statutes which
enumerate particular establishments embraced by the statute, many of the
courts have applied the "like kind" or ejusdem generis doctrine which limits
the application of the statute to establishments of a "like nature."5 Still other
courts have sought to carry out the purpose of the statute by construing the
statutes quite liberally.6 However, the exact differentiation between a public
accommodation and a bona fide private club has never been dearly drawn.
In deciding whether a particular organization is a public or a private
accommodation, Clover Hill held that the controlling question is whether or
not the organization owes its existence to a personal desire on the part of the
members to associate themselves with one another. This fundamental ques-
tion, which is derived from the individuals' right of privacy and freedom of
association,7 can only be answered by viewing the various aspects of a par-
ticular organization as a totality. The following questions reflect the criteria
used by the court for deciding the "associational preference" question. Is the
organization a commercial establishment operated for a profit? Does the club
solicit members from the public at large? To what extent do the members
enter into the management of the club?
Clover Hill was admittedly organized for profit and chartered as such
under the New Jersey laws of incorporation. The court indicated that this
fact alone would be enough to exclude Clover Hill from the exclusion given
the bona fide private clubs. Since the club's objective was to show a profit it
did not "owe its existence to the associational preference of its members but
I Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 47 NJ. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966).
2 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:25-5(L) (West Supp. 1964).
3 Note, "Public Accommodation Laws and the Private Club," 54 Geo. L.J. 915, 916,
918 (1966).
4 Faulkner v. Solazzi, 79 Conn. 541, 65 AtI. 947 (1907).
5 E.g. Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d 887, 338 P.2d 633
(Super. Ct. 1959) ; Rice v. Rinaldo, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 187, 119 N.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1951).
6 E.g. Evans v. Ross, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d 441 (App. Div. 1959), cert. denied,
31 N.J. 292, 157 A.2d 362 (1960).
7 Note, supra note 2, at 918.
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to the coincidence of their interest in the facilities offered by the owners."18 In
other cases clubs have been more subtle in their efforts to avoid the public
accommodation laws by establishing non-profit organizations. In such cases
the courts have looked beyond the superficial structure of the organization
itself and made inquiries into the amount of rent the organization pays and
to whom it is paid,9 the salaries that certain officers receive10 and the pre-
vious organizational structure if the club has not always operated on a mem-
bership basis." If the profits that would ordinarily accrue to an establishment
are being siphoned off by exhorbitant rent or salaries rather than being re-
turned to the members, the organization would undoubtedly be looked upon
as a purely commercial venture. The commercial nature of the venture be-
comes especially important when considered in light of such statutes as the
recently amended California Civil Rights Act which makes it unlawful to
discriminate because of race "in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever."' 2 (Emphasis added).
Another inquiry made by the court was whether Clover Hill had extend-
ed an invitation to the public. The court held that
an establishment which by advertising or otherwise extends an
invitation to the public generally is a place of public accommodation
and cannot use race ... as a basis for refusing ... those ... who
have accepted.' 3
Clover Hill had not engaged in any formal advertising but by placing an
advertisement in a local newspaper, ostensibly to promote safe ice skating, and
by erecting a sign containing two telephone numbers at the entrance of the
club, they had provided a means with which potential applicants could com-
municate with them and in so doing had extended an irrevocable invitation
to the public at large. "Once a proprietor extends his invitation to the public
he must treat all members of the public alike."' 4 This is not to say that a
public accommodation operated on a membership basis must accept all ap-
licants or that they cannot limit the use of the facilities to club members.
But the case does hold that race cannot be used as a criteria for issuing mem-
berships.
All aspects of Clover Hill's organization, including the selection of new
members, were controlled by a board of directors selected from the stock-
holders. The court found this to be quite inconsistent with the purpose of
the statutory exemption, i.e., "to protect the personal associational preferences
8 47 N.J. at -, 219 A.2d at 161 (1965).
9 Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186 (1957).
10 Lackey v. Sacoolas, 41 Pa. 235, 191 A.2d 395 (1963).
11 Sutton v. Capital Club Inc., 10 Race Rel. L. Rep. 791 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
12 Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Supp. 1965).
13 47 NJ. at -, 219 A.2d at 165.
14 Evans v, Ross, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 231, 154 A.2d 441, 445 (App. Div. 1959).
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of ... [the] members."'u An organizational structure that does not provide
a means with which the members can exercise an "associational preference"
through the selection of the officers and members casts doubt on the authenti-
city of the club. Bona fide private clubs are usually controlled by their mem-
bers while private facilities, seeking to avoid the consequences of the civil
rights statutes, are usually controlled by the owners.16
It is manifestly impossible to establish an exact formula with which the
"associational preference" question can be decided. But by considering the
criteria set out in Clover Hill some insight into the true nature of the organi-
zation may be obtained.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-UsE OF GR'm Jury TEsTIMoNY
FOR IMPEACHMENT-Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966)-The
defendants, officers of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers, were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States.' The
defendants, in order to obtain the services of the NLRB for their union, had
filed non-Communist affidavits as required by section 9(h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.2 The government alleged that the defendants had conspired to
avail themselves of the services by pretending to resign from the Communist
Party and then filing the required affidavits. At the first trial defendants
were convicted of the conspiracy, but the convictions were reversed on the
ground that prejudicial hearsay evidence was admitted.3 On retrial peti-
tioners were again convicted, and the convictions were affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
limited to the analysis of three questions 5 and reversed the convictions,
holding: That it was error for the trial court to refuse defendants' motion
15 47 N.J. at -, 219 A.2d at 166.
16 Brackeen v. Ruhlman, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 45, 48 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
1 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964), provides: "If two or more persons conspire either to
commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisioned not more than five years or both . . . . See generally, Gold-
stein, "Conspiracy to Defraud the United States," 68 Yale L.J. 405 (1959).
2 See 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. 504 (1964), replacing section 9(h), making it a crime
for a Communist Party member to hold office in any labor union. This statute was
held unconstitutional in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
3 Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962).
4 Dennis v. United States, 346 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1965).
5 (1) Does the indictment state the offense of conspiracy to defraud the United
States? (2) Is section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act constitutional? (3) Did the trial
court err in denying petitioners motion for disclosure of grand jury testimony? The
Court held the indictment was sufficient but that petitioners, by originally attempting to
avoid the courts, had no standing to challenge the constitutionality -of the statute. The
third question is discussed herein.
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for inspection of the related statements made by government witnesses be-
fore the grand jury for purposes of impeachment. 6
Grand jury testimony may be furnished to the defense in federal courts
under Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,7 and petitioners
argued that they had met the "particularized need" test for production under
that rule as established in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,8
since their convictions were primarily based on the uncorroborated oral
statements of certain government witnesses.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass held that where a particularized need could be
shown which outweighed the need for secrecy, the defendant was entitled
to inspect the relevant grand jury testimony for purposes of impeachment.
What was mean by "particularized need" has since been unclear as the only
standards were that a preliminary showing of inconsistency in testimony was
not necessary 9 and that disclosure was proper where the ends of justice re-
quired it.'0
Following Pittsburgh Plate Glass there developed a split in the federal
circuits as to that case; it became an authority for both allowing" and,
more often, denying' 2 defendants access to the grand jury minutes. It was
this split that the Court attempted to eliminate through the announcement
of a clearer standard in the instant case.
The development of a standard for production of grand jury minutes
to the defense began in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. in which
the Court said, "But after the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure
is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it."'1 United States v.
0 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
7 The relevant section of Rule 6(e) states,
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made available to the attorneys for the
government for the use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror,
attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any
typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that ground may exist for a motion
to dismisss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
8 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
9 Id. at 400.
10 Id. at 401.
11 See, e.g., DeBinder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United
States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (dictum); United States v. Hernandez,
282 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960).
12 See, e.g., Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961) ; United States v.
Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961); Travis v.
United States, 269 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 631
(1961). See, Traynor, "Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery," 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 228, 239 n.56 (1964). See generally, Note 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1181-89 (1963).
13 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
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Procter & Gamble followed stating that, "there is a long established policy
that maintains the secrecy of grand jury testimony," 14 but, "problems con-
cerning the use of grand jury testimony transcripts at the trial to impeach
a witness, to refresh his recollection and to test his credibility..., 'are' cases
of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discreetly
and limitedly."'15
Most of the present disagreement as to when testimony should be dis-
closed stems from the fact that on the face of Pittsburgh Plate Glass there
seemed to be a possibility of impeaching an important government witness
if access to grand jury testimony were granted, yet the court refused to find
that this was a case of particularized need and did not order production.
Dennis distinguished Pittsburgh Plate Glass saying that it was based on
petitioner's demand as a right and his failure to show any need, there being
sufficient proof of the offense without reference to the witness's trial testi-
mony.' 6 The question is, are all requests for impeachment testimony now
cases of particularized need? The answer, as will be developed, seems to
be a qualified yes.
Pointing the way to the establishment of a new standard for the produc-
tion of grand jury minutes is the Court's re-evaluation of the applicability
of the rationale of Jencks v. United States'7 and the resulting Jencks Act
which permits disclosure to the defense, for impeachment purposes, of certain
pretrial statements held by the government, on the theory that a fairer trial
will result from the defense having access to this often necessary evidence.' 8 In
the past the Jencks' rationale has not been applied to the grand jury testi-
mony.' 9 Commentators have pointed out that the legislative materials upon
14 United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1957).
15 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966) quoting from United States
v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1960), where the statement was,
We do not reach in this case problems concerning the use of grand jury tran-
scripts at the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his
credibility and the like. Those are cases of particularized need where the
secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly.
16 384 U.S. 855, where the Court said at 869-70, "In general, however, the Court
has confirmed the trial court's power under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to direct disclosure of grand jury testimony 'preliminary to or in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding."
'7 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
18 See Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961):
To that extent, as the legislative history makes clear, the Jencks Act 'reaffirms'
our holding in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, that the defendant on
trial in a federal criminal prosecution is entitled, for impeachment purposes, to
relevant and competent statements of a government witness in possession of the
Government touching the events or activities as to which the witness has testi-
fied at trial .... The command of the statute is thus designed to further the
fair and just administration of criminal justice, a goal of which the judiciary
is the special guardian.
'9 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959).
[Vol. 28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
which the Court's prior position was based show no policy against disclosure
of grand jury testimony,20 and the Court's approval of Jencks in Dennis
strongly points to the adoption of a Jencks-like procedure to allow disclosure
of testimony after the witness has testified in court.21 Likewise, the growing
use of discovery in the civil courts and the implementation of more discovery
in the criminal rules, particulary those not covered under the Jencks Act,
are cited with favor.2
2
At the heart of the problem is the balancing factor: the need of the
defendant versus the needs of society for secrecy in the use of grand jury
materials. The Court states that in the use of grand jury testimony for im-
peachment, the need for secrecy generally is at best minimal23 and that the
traditional arguments for secrecy did not apply.2 4 This is particularly true
where the need for disclosure is very compelling.25
"In our adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely
justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of
relevant fact."26 There is never any justification for relying on the assump-
tion that no important inconsistencies will come to light if the grand jury
:0 See Sherry, "Grand jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy," 48 Va.
L. Rev. 668 (1962); Traynor, supra note 12, at 240; "The Supreme Court, 1958 Term,"
73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 185 (1959); Murphy, Congress and the Court, 127 (1962).
21 384 U.S. at 870, where the Court said,
These developments are entirely consonant with the growing realization that
disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes
the proper administration of criminal justice. This realization is reflected in
the enactment of the so-called Jencks Act. . . responding to this Court's deci-
sion in Jencks v. United States ....
22 Id. at 871, n.17 and related text.
23 Id. at 872 n.18 citing Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959); Calkins, "Grand jury Secrecy," 63 Mich. L. Rev.
455 (1964) ; Brennan, "The CriminaloProsecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?"
1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 279; Sherry, supra note 20.
24 The traditional arguments for secrecy as stated in United States v. Rose, 215
F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954) and United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical
Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.C. Md. 1931), are (1) To prevent the escape of those
whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the
grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at
the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to
protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has
been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no
probability of guilt.
25 The Court in Dennis, 384 US. at 872-73, lists five facts which displayed the
requisite need, (1) 7 year delay in trial, (2) testimony of witness in question was crucial,
(3) important evidence was uncorroborated oral statements, (4) witnesses had possible
reasons for perjury, (5) one significant error had been discovered.
26 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966).
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testimony is compared and examined.2 7 Even with the petitioner having an
opportunity to thoroughly cross examine the witness and no inconsistencies
being found, the possibility still exists for finding inconsistencies in the two
testimonies 28 It is now clear that for the defense to be allowed access to
grand jury minutes it is not necessary to show that there in fact is a possi-
bility of impeachment; only the most limited grounds for showing possible
value in impeachment need be laid.
Along with facilitating access to the grand jury minutes for the defense,
the court ruled on how inspection of these minutes was to be made. The
in camera inspection used in the Second Circuit,2 9 though it was found to
be useful when the judge rules on a defense motion for production to it
of grand jury testimony, cannot be a prerequisite for inspection by the de-
fendant because it places too great a burden on the judge in looking for in-
consistencies and because effective determination of what may be useful to
the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate.30 The
trial judge's function is limited to determining whether a case has been made
for production and to supervise the process, that is to cause the elimination of
extraneous matter and to rule upon the application by the government for
protective orders.3 1
It is clear that for the defense to now obtain production of grand jury
minutes it need only show that impeachment may have some bearing32 on
the outcome of the case. It then becomes the burden of the government to
show that the need for secrecy outweighs the defense's need by the "clearest
and most compelling considerations."3 3 The judge may have to delete extra-
neous material and items such as the votes of the jurors, but the inspection
27 Id. at 874.
28 Id. at 866-69, 874.
29 See United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961). In camera inspection
is a procedure whereby the judge in privacy previews the particular testimony before
deciding which parts are relevant to the defense and should be given to it.
30 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
31 Ibid. This is much like the procedure used under the Jencks Act, 18 US.C.
3500(c) (1964) which states:
If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of
the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver
such statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery
the court shall excise the portions of such statements which do not relate to
the subject matter of the testimony of the witness ...
32 See also Louisdell, "Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?," 49
Calif. L. Rev. 56, 73 (1961).
33 See Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, supra note 23 at 407:
Surely "Justice requires no less" Jencks v. United States, . . . than the de-
fense be permitted every reasonable opportunity to'impeach a government wit-
ness, and that a criminal conviction not be based on the testimony of untruthful
or inaccurate witnesses. The interest of the United States in a criminal prosecu-
tion, it must be emphasized, "is not that it shall win a case but that justice
shall be done . . . "
See also United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 667 (2d Cir. 1959).
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seems now to be available to the defendant only upon showing of some
value of impeachment.
34
Judging from the experience of other jurisdictions which have made
defense access to grand jury minutes easier,35 there is no reason to fear
Dennis will impede the effective administration of criminal justice, and it
would appear that Rule 6(e) may well permit disclosure before the witness
has testified 6 The question remains whether this decision will be binding
on the states, particularly those like Ohio which do not allow any dis-
closure.3 7 The decision itself probably will not directly affect the states since
the decision was based upon an interpretation of federal procedure and not
constitutional grounds as was Jencks which has been interpreted so as not
to bind the states.38 However, some of the authorities feel that a complete
denial of access to grand jury minutes would be violative of the right to a
fair trial guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment.3 9
TORTS-NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT RIGHTs-DAmAGES
HELD NOT TO INCLUDE PORTION OF CONTRACT PROPERTY-Rockaway Blvd.
Wrecking & Lumber Co. v. Raylite Elec. Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 9, 269
N.Y.S2d 926 (1966)-Plaintiff, Rockaway Boulevard Wrecking & Lumber
Company, was under contract with the New York Housing Authority to
demolish a building owned by the Authority. In addition, the contract pro-
vided that the materials forming a permanent part of the building "shall
become" property of the plaintiff upon demolition of the building.3 A fire,
34 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966).
35 For a suggested procedure see Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, at
409-10.
30 See, Sherry, supra note 20 at 681-84 (discussion of California procedure and
results), cf. Louisell, supra note 31 at 65-67 (discussion of the English system).
37 State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910); State v. Shelby, 69 Ohio
L. Abs. 481, 126 N.E.2d 606 (C.P. 1955).
38 See, Riser v. Teets, 253 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958);
Anderson v. State, 239 Ind. 372, 156 N.E.2d 384 (1959); People v. Marshall, 5 App.
Div. 2d 352, 172 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1958). See also Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343, 345 (1959). See, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, supra note 20 at 182; Note, 34
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 606, 618 (1959).
39 See Brennan's concurrence, Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 342, 362 (1959):
"It is true that our holding in Jencks was not put on Constitutional grounds, for
it did not have to be; but it would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution
were not dose to the surface of the decision; indeed, the Congress recognized its Consti-
tutional overtones in the debates on the statute." See Traynor, supra note 9 at 242 n.77.
Cf. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961), noted
in 62 Colum. L. Rev. 526 (1962), (Suppression by prosecutor of material evidence violates
due process); Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1958) (Refusal to permit inspec-
tion of own statements in perjury trial was the denial of a fair trial.).
1 Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking & Lumber Co. v. Raylite Elec. Corp., 26 App. Div.
2d 9, 10, 269 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (1966).
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alleged to have been negligently started in an adjoining warehouse owned by
the defendant, spread to the building the plaintiff was under contract to
demolish and caused considerable damage.
Plaintiff brought a property action in the civil court of New York City
to recover 2,000 dollars for damages to the salvageables and 890 dollars for
added costs incurred in demolition of the building as a result of the fire. The
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff
had no interest in the building or salvageables sufficient to sustain a cause of
action was denied by the civil court and affirmed by the Appellate Term of
the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department. On appeal, the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court for the same department held "[A] I-
though something short of legal ownership, the contractor's interest in the
salvageables was sufficently cognizable at the time of the fire to ground the
present action for damages." 2 However, as to the extra costs incurred in
demolition of the building the court reaffirmed the "general rule" prohibiting
recovery for negligent interference with contract rights and denied that por-
tion of the plaintiff's claim.3
The problem of how far, and against what types of invasion the rights
obtained under a contract will be protected has been troubling courts and
legal writers for many years.4 Most courts agree that an intentional and
malicious interference with a contract relationship by an outside party will
support an action for damages.5 However, if C, through his negligence, causes
A to break his contract with B or negligently imposes a greater contract
burden on B than was originally contemplated, then courts will generally
refuse to allow B to recover damages in an action against C.6
Many reasons have been advanced by the courts to support their re-
fusal to allow recovery for negligent interference with contract rights. (1) It
would place an undue burden upon freedom of action and impose a severe
penalty for negligent conduct.7 (2) It would lead to collusive claims.8 (3) It
2 Id. at 12, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
3 Ibid.
4 See, Carpenter, "Interference With Contract Relations," 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728
(1928); H1arper, "Interference With Contractual Relations," 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 873
(1953); Green, "Relational Interests," 29 Ill. L. Rev. 1041 (1935); Note, 31 Harv. L.
Rev. 1017 (1918); Note, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 664 (1964); Comment, 18 Cornell L.Q. 292
(1933).
5 E.g., Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853); S. C.
Prosner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N.Y. 325, 119 N.E. 573 (1918); Carnes v. St. Paul Union
Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 205 N.W. 630 (1925).
6 E.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Stevenson v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1946); Byrd v. English,
117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903).
7 Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., supra note 6; Byrd v. English, supra note 6.
8 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., supra note 6. The
courts feel that if A negligently injures B, B and C will be in a position to 'nvent"
a contract whereby C will profit from B's inability to perform.
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would be difficult to apportion damages.9 (4) The damages are too remote.10
(5) The damages are unforeseeable."
The court in the Rockaway case' 2 was not willing to overrule this strong
judicial precedent 3 when it permitted the plaintiff to recover for damages
done to the salvageables. Instead, they recognized the right to future pos-
session of a chattel as a protectable interest similar to a bailor's right to sue
for damage to a chattel while in the possession of a bailee.1 4 To insure that
it would not be understood that they were protecting the plaintiff's contract
rights the court clearly reaffirmed the rule prohibiting recovery for negligent
interference with contract rights when they denied recovery for the increased
demolition costs.
Despite an attempt to camouflage their decision, the court was, in effect,
recognizing the plaintiff's right to the salvageables as a contract right to be
protected against negligent interference. The court then proceeded to draw
a questionable distinction when they refused to allow recovery for the negli-
gent creation of the added cost of demolition.'5 The right to the salvageables
stemmed from an executory contract. The defendant damaged the salvage-
ables, thereby injuring the plaintiff's property-the contract right to the
salvageables. Likewise, the negligence of the defendant increased the cost of
demolishing the building. In this way the defendant's conduct also injured
the plaintiff's property-the contract right to performance as was originally
contemplated by the parties.
The confusion surrounding the decision in the Rockaway case is a
result of the basic disagreement over the extent to which negligent inter-
ference with contract rights should be an actionable tort. Although there
seems to be general agreement that negligent interference with a contract
right is not actionable,' 6 because of the questionable validity of the reasons
advanced to support this rule results are reached, as in the instant case,
where, in effect, negligent interference with a contract right was considered
actionable although the court characterized the action as protection of "a
right to future possession of a chattel."17
The weakness of the reasons advanced to deny liability for negligent
interference with contract rights, while recognizing liability for intentional
9 Note, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1017, 1020 (1918). As in the present case, there might
be a problem apportioning damages between the plaintiff and the New York Housing
Authority.
10 Byrd v. English, supra note 6; Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat
Co., 280 Mass. 282, 182 N.E. 477 (1932).
11 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, supra note 6.
12 26 App. Div. 2d 9, 269 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1966).
13 Cases cited supra note 6.
14 The court cited the case of Royal Stein, Inc., v. B.C.U. Holding Corp., 283 App.
Div. 700, 127 N.YS.2d 886 (1954) in which the bailor sued for damage done to his
reversionary interest in a chattel.
15 Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking & Lumber Co. v. Raylite Elec. Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d
9, 12, 269 N.Y.S.2d 926, 929.
16 Cases cited note 6 supra.
17 Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking & Lumber Co. v. Raylite Elec. Corp. supra note 1.
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interference, is best shown by the arguments that extension of liability would
lead to collusive claims' 8 and difficulty in apportioning damages.19 These
two arguments are not peculiar to negligence cases. The very same problems
are involved in intentional interference with contract cases, but have not
been an impediment to the growth of liability in that area.20
Further, the argument that it would place an undue burden upon free-
dom of action and be a severe penalty for negligent conduct2 ' was used
years ago to deny recovery to injured parties not in privity with the manu-
facturer of a defective product 2 Today this field of torts has advanced
beyond liability for negligence23 into the area of strict liability. 24
The final two arguments advanced to deny recovery, that the damages
were too remote25 or unforeseeable2 6 are immediately recognized as well es-
tablished doctrines of negligence law. To say that the damages were too
remote or unforeseeable is to simply say that the defendant was not negli-
gent, and not that there is no recognized cause of action for negligent in-
terference with contract rights.
Therefore, perhaps a more consistent result could have been achieved
in the Rockaway case if the court had begun by recognizing the tort of negli-
gent interference with contract rights and then applied the standard rules
of negligence. The damage to the building adjoining the defendant's prop-
erty was a foreseeable risk. Hence, all persons with a recognizable property
right in the building, whether present or future right, could sue for damage
to such interest. However, the added cost of demolishing the building was
beyond the scope of the risk created by the defendant and therefore the
plaintiff cannot recover, but not because there was no remedy, but because
there was no wrong.
In conclusion, the court in the Rockaway case did reach the right re-
sult, but arguably for the wrong reasons. No insurmountable objection exists
to allowing recovery for negligent interference with contract rights Foresee-
ability and proximate cause are adequate devices to limit the scope of liability
as the courts see fit according to the facts of each case. But the reasons ad-
vanced in the Rockaway case to allow recovery for damages to the salvage-
ables and to deny recovery for the added costs of demolition will only per-
petuate an area of the law that remains beclouded by antiquated reasoning
and decisions.
18 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., supra note 6.
19 Supra note 9.
20 Supra note 5.
21 Supra note 7.
22 Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
23 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
24 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958); Colon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. N.Y.
1960); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (ND. Ind. 1965); Lonzrick v.
Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965).
25 Supra note 10.
28 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, supra note 6.
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Cl R ][NAL LAW-NONCONSENSUAL BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST HELD NOT TO
BE VIOLATIVE OF FOURTH OR FIFTH AmENn mENTS-Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966)-After an automobile collision in which he was the
driver, petitioner was taken to a hospital. There, an investigating officer
detected alcohol on petitioner's breath and arrested him for driving under
the influence of alcohol. Upon advice of counsel, petitioner refused to submit
to a blood alcohol test, but, the police rejected this and, without a warrant,
ordered that a sample be taken. Over petitioner's objection on fourth, fifth,
sixth, and fourteenth amendment grounds, the test results were admitted
at trial and he was convicted. The conviction was affirmed, and certification
to the California District Court of Appeals was denied. The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari,1 and affirmed holding, inter alia:
(1) nonconsensual blood tests are not testimonial and thus not within the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) although such in-
trusions do constitute searches and seizures, they nevertheless are constitu-
tional if justified, and if the procedures employed in taking blood meet
fourth amendment standards of reasonableness. 2 Because an earlier case
had held such tests to comport with due process,3 the Court had no trouble
overruling petitioner's fourteenth amendment objection. Dealing next with
petitioner's self-incrimination challenge, the Court had to consider the scope
of the fifth amendment. One week earlier, in Miranda v. Arizona,4 strong
safeguards against excesses of police interrogation had been provided by
the Court in order to guarantee the inviolability of the privilege in the pre-
trial investigative process. The statement in that case, that the government
must convict an accused, "by its own independent labors . . . ,5 would
seem to create doubt as to whether the police are permitted, by the fifth
amendment, to compel an accused to cooperate at all in collecting evidence
against him, regardless of whether the evidence sought is such as has tra-
ditionally been considered to be privileged, or, is just physical evidence
in the accused's control. If such a policy had been intended, compelling
petitioner to submit to a blood test would have violated the privilege.6
But the scope of the fifth amendment privilege, adopted by the Court
in Schmerber, is not that broad. The telling quality of privileged matter,
by the Court's analysis, is that it invokes only the "testimonial capacity" of
the person from whom it is compelled. This language suggests, as the Court
acknowledges, 7 a widely applied test, articulated by Wigmore. Under this
1 382 U.S. 971 (1966).
2 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
3 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1; Id. at 460.
6 Blood tests have been held to violate the privilege by some state courts. See,
e.g., State v. Lorenz, 406 P.2d 278 (Okla. Crim., 1965); Combes v. Kelly 2 Misc. 2d
491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Trammell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287
S.W.2d 487 (1956); Cf. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
7 384 U.S. at 763n.7.
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view, only evidence which invokes "the moral obligation for truthtelling"
is privileged.$ However, the Court found that determining privileged evi-
dence by using the terms "communicative" or "testimonial" in contra-
distinction to "physical" or "real" was a device of limited usefulness, and
declined to adopt past applications of Wigmore's formula in all instances.
This partial rejection might be taken as an indication that the Court
intends to re-examine the scope of the privilege. But whatever changes the
Court's reservations of the efficacy of the "testimonial" test might suggest,
resolution of the issue must necessarily wait for later cases since no general
principle indicating what scope the privilege will be given is enunciated in
Sckmerber. Questions such as whether an accused can be compelled to give
a handwriting exemplar,9 or to make movements,' 0 or to assume positions"
that witnesses claim to have observed during the perpetration of a crime,
were avoided. Instead, the Court spoke of "communicative acts or writ-
ings"12 or, physical evidence which evokes the "spirit and history of the
fifth amendment"' 3 as being within the privilege. Unfortunately, such
phrases merely ask, in another way, what sort of acts, writings, or physical
evidence are privileged.
Nevertheless, the Court did depart from this cautious approach long
enough to specifically state that lie detector tests are within the scope of
the privilege. This was apparently done to preclude the inference that re-
sults of such tests would be admitted on the theory that they can be thought
of as obtaining only physical evidence. 14 The Court said that such a super-
ficial analysis would fail, since lie detector tests compel evidence that is
essentially testimonial and, therefore, invoke the "spirit and history" of the
privilege.
Unlike lie detector tests, blood tests lack the essential ingredient-
compelled exercise of an accused's "testimonial capacity'"-necessary to bring
within the privilege evidence that could be characterized as physical or real.
Therefore, petitioner's privilege was not violated.
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2264 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
9 Compelling an exemplar was permitted on cross examination after denial of
forgery on direct in Mann v. State, 33 Ala. App. 115, 30 So.2d 462 (1947). But an
exemplar compelled during interrogation was held inadmissible in Kennison v. State,
97 Tex. Crim. 154, 260 S.W. 174 (1924).
30 In Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959), defendant
was compelled to walk away and look over his shoulder. But cf. Spencer v. State, 404
P.2d 46 (Okla. Crim. 1965).
11 Allowed in State v. Nelville, 175 N.C. 731, 95 S.E. 55 (1918). Contra, Aiken v.
State, 16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S.E. 1076 (1913).
12 384 U.S. at 764.
'3 Ibid.
14 It is doubtful that any court would hold compelled lie detector tests admis-
sible. Under Wigmore's analysis, lie detector tests implicate the privilege. 8 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2265 at (11) (McNaughton rev. 1961). Even advocates of the tests seem
to admit this. See Inbau, Self-Incrimination 67 (1950). See also Herman, "The Use
of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases," 25 Ohio St. LJ. 1, 30-34 (1964).
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Petitioner's right to counsel argument fared no better than his fifth
amendment claim. Because his refusal to permit the blood test was made on
his attorney's advice, petitioner urged that disregarding his refusal was a
denial of his right to counsel. The Court rejected this, saying that if there
was no right to refuse, counsel's advice did not create one. Furthermore, an
accused's right to counsel applies only to help him protect bona fide rights;
it does not protect rights which are erroneously thought to exist. Stated
simply, one cannot lose that which he does not have.
Moving next to the search and seizure question, the Court held that
petitioner's blood test was pursuant to a valid arrest. In testing the validity
of the search, the Court first considered the lack of a warrant, and found
that the danger of destruction of the evidence justified the arresting officer's
failure to obtain one. At one time, searches pursuant to a valid arrest were
permitted only if there was a search warrant, or if the lack of the warrant
was justified by an emergency.15 This was discarded,"- and, the rule that
no warrant is needed (in a search incident to a valid arrest) regardless of
whether an emergency exists has since been developed. 17 This policy raised
strong dissents from the outset,' 8 and the fact that the Court felt it neces-
sary, in Schmerber, to find an emergency before approving the lack of a
warrant may suggest a return to the earlier standard.
In addition to warrants, the fourth amendment requires that searches
be reasonable and made on probable cause.' 9 In considering the reason-
ableness of taking petitioner's blood, the Court looked to the manner of
taking it. They found that acceptable medical practices had been followed.
It was suggested that had the test been made by police in a station house,
rather than by a physician in a hospital, the search would probably have
been unreasonable 20 Probable cause for the search existed because peti-
tioner's outward appearance of drunkenness reasonably led to the conclusion
that his blood would contain alcohol. Because of the considerations of
"human dignity and privacy," the Court held that intrusions into the human
body required not only probable cause, but also a clear indication that the
evidence sought would be obtained, an apparent strengthening of the prob-
able cause necessary for search without a warrant.
It was not considered necessary to inquire whether blood was an item
permissibly seizable under the mere evidence rule of Gouled v. United
States.e2 That case held that seizure must be based on the power of the
police to either: (1) Recover items in which the public or a complainant
15 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
16 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
17 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S.
346 (1957).
18 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (dissenting opinion); Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
19 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
20 384 U.S. at 771-72.
21 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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has a greater right to possession than the present holder, or, (2) Take
items, the possession of which, has been made illegal.2 2 If a seizure cannot
be justified on these grounds, but is made only to obtain evidence, it is "evi-
dentary," and therefore, illegal.2 3 By so limiting permissible seizure, the
Gouled Court hoped to achieve one of the historic aims of the fourth amend-
ment-limiting the general search.2 The rule has been more specifically
stated as only allowing the seizure of fruits or instrumentalities of a crime,
weapons that could be used in escape, or contraband. 2 ; A strict application
of this principle would seem to render blood tests not permissibly seizable.
But the rule has been applied so as to seriously limit its effectiveness. Courts
have been ingenious in finding matter to be in a permissibly seizable cate-
gory,2 6 and have not applied Gouled to tangible evidence 2 7 Furthermore,
though the Gouled decision was based on the fourth amendment, the rule has
not been applied to the states s.2 In Schmerber, this trend toward contracting
the rule was furthered by the revelation of an apparently new limitation-
the rule applies only to the seizure of property. Using this test the court
concluded that blood was not property, and therefore that no mere evidence
question was raised. The explanation given-that Gouled only limits state
interference with property relationships, and is not helpful in examining in-
trusions into the human body-is of dubious validity.29 But accepting this,
though it seems to go to the manner of the search rather than the permis-
sibility of the seizure, one is still left wondering what blood is if it is not
property.
However, Schmerber's impact on the question of proper seizure will
probably not come from its adding yet another obscure limitation to the
mere evidence rule. Instead the case's significance in this area may be found
in the Court's considering the lack of a warrant, the manner of the search,
and the strength of the probable cause, which along with the continued under-
22 Id. at 309.
23 Id. at 310.
24 See 2 Corwin, Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 1399 (1938); 1 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations 610 (8th Edition 1927).
25 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
26 Marron v. United States, 27S U.S. 192 (1927) (ledger used by parties operating
an illegal still).
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) ("seizure" of conversation
by electronic device held valid).
28 Two states, California, in People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780,
408 P.2d 108 (1965), and New York, in People v. Carrol, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d
640 (Sup. Ct. 1963), have recently rejected the rule despite Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). But see Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966), a federal habeas
corpus proceeding holding Gouled applicable to the states. Florida, in State v. Willard,
54 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1951), and Wyoming, in State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac.
683 (1924), have apparently adopted Gouled on their own. See also Comment, 27
Ohio St. LJ. 480, 492-93 (1966).
29 See Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319 (1953), for a discussion of the rationale
of the Gouled case.
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cutting of Gouled, could indicate a coming departure from the flat prohibi-
tion against evidentiary searches. Gouled might be too broad a protection
against fourth amendment abuses. It is possible that when matter seized
can be categorized as other than property or "tangible," evidentiary searches
will be permitted, if conducted in a manner paying sufficient deference to
human dignity and privacy, and controlled by more stringent warrants and
probable cause requirements. Furthermore, the property-nonproperty dis-
tinction made by the Court could be short lived. A possible outcome is
that the evidentiary search prohibition of Gouled will be discarded altogether,
rather than further weakened, thus permitting the seizure of mere evidence
in some cases. The guidelines set out in Sckmerber to test the taking of
petitioner's blood seem to be a more precise safeguard against the general
search, and may govern searches in general.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PoLL TAX-VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
-Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)-
Virginia residents brought suits in a federal district court for the purpose
of having the Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions, which re-
quired the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting, declared to be
in violation of the federal constitution, and for the purpose of having their
enforcement permanently enjoined. The amount of the tax in question was
one dollar and fifty cents per year and a citizen must have paid the tax for
the three years next preceding the year of the election in which he desired
to vote, and must have paid the tax six months prior to the election in order
to be eligible to vote.
The district court dismissed the complaint, feeling bound to follow
Breedlove v. Suttles,l which had previously upheld the Virginia poll tax.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a tax as a prerequisite
to voting violates the equal protection clause, in that a person's ability to
pay a tax has no relation to that person's qualifications as a voter.2
The Court had previously upheld the validity of the poll tax in both
Breedlove3 and in Butler v. Thompson,4 but in neither case did the Court
consider the issue of economic discrimination presented in Harper.
In Breedlove, the equal protection argument was based not on dis-
crimination between rich and poor, but upon the fact that certain classes
of persons were exempted from payment of the tax.; The Court upheld
these exceptions as being reasonable. In Butler, an equal protection argument
was not made; the attack on the tax was based on discrimination in the
1 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
2 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
3 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
4 184 F.2d 526 (1950), aff'd. per curiam 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
G Exempted from the poll tax were those over 60 or under 21, or women unless
they registered.
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application of the poll tax to Negroes in violation of the fifteenth amend-
ment.6
Recent emphasis on the equal protection clause, in contrast to the past
when it was disparagingly characterized as "the usual last resort of con-
stitutional arguments," 7 raises question as to the scope of that clause in
the future. Though it is now generally accepted that equal protection of
the laws means the.protection of equal laws,8 it is clear that all laws affect
different classes of people in different ways; all laws are discriminatory or
unequal in some way.9 To do away with all discrimination is impossible,
since regulatory laws are a necessity, but some, "invidious discrimination,"
will not be tolerated, and thus, it becomes necessary to distinguish the reason-
able discrimination from that which is invidious. 10
In Morey v. Doud" the Court summarized the test of invidious dis-
crimination as follows:
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does
not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality.12
While it is obvious that the fifteenth, nineteenth, and now twenty-
fourth amendments set limitations on the voting qualifications a state may
impose, it has been vigorously argued that the fourteenth amendment was not
meant by its framers to restrict all the voting qualifications a state may set.13
However, Lassiter v. Northampton County Election Bd.14 and Carrington v.
Rash15 now make it clear that the fourteenth amendment does restrict the
qualifications a state may set upon the voting privilege.
In Lassiter, the first recent case dealing with state voting requirements
as violating the equal protection clause and the first case in which the Court
analyzed the purpose of voter qualification, the Court upheld as valid a
6 Butler v. Thompson, supra note 4.
7 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
8 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See also Huang-Thio, "Equal
Protection and Rational Classification" 1963 Pub. L. 412.
9 Tressman & Tenbrock, "The Equal Protection of the Laws" 37 Calif. L. Rev.
341 (1949).
10 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
11 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
12 Id., at 463-464.
13 The appellee's brief dealt at great length (25 out of 44 pages) on why the
fourteenth amendment does not limit the state's power to prescribe voter qualifications.
See also justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964).
14 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
15 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
[Vol. 28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
literacy test. The Court found a reasonable relationship between literacy
and the legitimate purpose of that voting restriction: the intelligent use
of the ballot.16
In Carrington v. Rash-7 the Court struck down a state voting restric-
tion that prohibited men in the armed forces from voting. There the Court
said, "The courts must reach and determine the question whether the clas-
sifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose."' 8 There
the Court found no reasonable relation between the prohibition and any of
the state's alleged purposes, and thus, the restrictions violated the equal
protection clause.
These two recent cases adopt a standard of constitutionality based on
the fourteenth amendment that requires any restriction on voting to have
a reasonable relationship with a legitimate state purpose. Thus, the way is
cleared for future Court determination as to what is a valid or legitimate
state interest that can be achieved through the use of voter qualification.
It is clear that the intelligent use of the ballot is a legitimate state purpose.
Another case recently accepted as a legitimate state purpose the insurance
"that the voter will become in fact a member of the community and as
such have a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government."' 9
Though the result in Harper is not surprising in the light of the recent
Voting Rights Act 20 in which Congress declared poll taxes as a prerequisite
to voting in federal elections unlawful, it is of interest to note the rationale
used in declaring Virginia's restriction on voting in state elections uncon-
stitutional.
The Supreme Court might have struck down the poll tax, as was done
in United States v. Alabama.21 There, the court said, "The necessary effect
of the poll tax as adopted in 1901 was to disfranchise Negro voters ...
Such clear and intentional attempt to deny or abridge the right to vote
necessarily runs afoul of the fifteenth amendment." 22 The court, in that
case placed primary emphasis, however, on the unequal administration of
16 Lassiter v. Northampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
'7 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
18 Carrington v. Rash, supra note 15.
19 Dreuding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724 (1964), aff'd. per curiam, 380 U.S. 125
(1965).
20 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 10, 79 Stat. 437, 442-43 (1965).
The Congress finds that the requirement of a poll tax as a precondition to vot-
ing (i) precludes persons of limited means from voting or imposes unreason-
able financial hardship upon such persons as a precondition to their exercise
of the franchise, (ii) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate
State interest in the conduct of elections, and (iii) in some areas has the pur-
pose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because of race or color.
Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that the constitutional right
of citizens to vote is denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of
the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting.
21 252 F. Supp. 95 (1966).
22 Id., at 99.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the tax, but in Harper there was apparently no evidence of unequal adminis-
tration. Had the Court then, in the absence of unequal administration, held
the tax unconstitutional under the fifteenth amendment because the Negro
is, in general, poorer than the Caucasian, it would also seem to follow that
literacy tests would also violate the fifteenth amendment, because the
illiteracy rate among Negroes is higher than among Caucasians. 23
The Supreme Court might also have struck down the Virginia poll tax,
on the grounds used in United States v. Texas.24 There, the Court stated that
"the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in the State of Texas infringes on the
concept of liberty as protected by the Due Process Clause and constitutes
an invalid charge on the exercise of one of our most precious rights. '25 Had
the Court in Harper based its striking down of the poll tax on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment because it infringed on the
right to vote, however, the Court would necessarily have to look at other
qualifications previously held valid-literacy tests, non-convicition of a
felony, and residence for a period. They, too, infringe upon one of our most
precious rights-voting.
By basing its decision in Harper on the equal protection clause, the
Court has not opened the door to an attack on all voter qualifications. In
a selective process only those which do not bear a reasonable relation to a
legitimate state interest will be struck down. It is evident from Harper and
Morey v. Doud that the test of invidious discrimination is one of reasonable-
ness; that is, does the discrimination bear a reasonable relation to some
legitimate state purpose?
Harper makes it clear that the test of reasonableness in the context of
civil liberties26 is not the same as in the area of commercial activity; 2 7 the
relationship between a restriction and its purpose must be closer where the
restriction is on a fundamental right. This is indicated from two factors upon
which the Court in Harper based its decision: (1) the discrimination in-
volved the right to vote, one which is fundamental to the preservation of all
other rights, and (2) the discrimination was between members of different
economic classes.28
The State of Virginia offered four state interests served by the poll
tax: the tax was (1) a source of revenue; (2) a method of keeping the
rolls of registered voters up to date; (3) a test of minimum capacity for
ordering one's own affairs as a qualification for participation in the ordering
of the affairs of the state; and (4) evidence of a permanent interest in and
23 Statistical Abstract of the United States (1966) p. 116, table 159. In 1959,
7.5% of non-whites 14 and over were illiterate, while only 1.6% of whites 14 and
over were illiterate.
24 252 F. Supp. 234 (1966).
25 Id., at 255.
26 Supra note 11, and related text.
27 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1934).
28 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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attachment to the community.2 9 The poll tax, however, was not a reasonable
means of achieving these probably legitimate state interests. The tax brought
about a discrimination between rich and poor, and "lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property like those of race are traditionally disfavored; "30
"wealth, like race, creed or color, is not germane to one's ability to partici-
pate in the electoral process." 31
Harper emphasizes the relative importance of voting rights and the
unwillingness on the part of the court to allow a person to be deprived of
that right because of his inability to pay any tax. "The degree of discrimina-
tions is irrelevant,"3 2 and cases involving discrimination in a commercial
context33 are not controlling because of the nature of the right involved.
20 Brief for Appellees, pp. App. AS-App. A8.
80 383 U.S. at 668.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 See Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, 348 US. 483 (1955); Goesaert v. Cleasy, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1934).

